外显记忆中的再现与体现性共鸣:现象学方法与建构理论的调和

IF 2 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Francesca Righetti
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文通过现象学分析研究了外显记忆的体现层面。当代哲学理论将外显记忆理解为 "发生在头脑中 "的过去事件的心理表征。现象学的哲学观点似乎支持对外显记忆的具身理解。现象学传统上从 "呈现化 "的角度来理解外显记忆,这意味着再现前景体验中意识的过去部分,复制之前的感知活动。然而,这似乎与外显记忆的建构性理论不一致,后者强调主体如何在记忆中转换视角或包含前述体验中不存在的信息。因此,根据这些当代理论,外显记忆不太可能意味着重放过去的有意识体验。我认为,如果我们对体现层面进行研究,那么就有可能调和现象学方法和建构理论。更确切地说,我将调查建立在对操作意向性及其在比较程序性记忆和外显记忆中的作用的分析之上。我认为,意识的再现性修改有两个体现性特征:一是对先前操作意向性的灵活再现,二是与我已不再是的代理产生体现性共鸣的前反思模式。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Re-enactment and embodied resonance in episodic memory: reconciling phenomenological approaches and constructive theories

This paper investigates the embodied dimensions of episodic memory through a phenomenological analysis. Contemporary philosophical theories understand episodic memory as a mental representation of a past event ‘happening in the head’. A philosophical account that seemingly supports an embodied understanding of episodic memory comes from phenomenology. Phenomenology has traditionally understood episodic memory in terms of presentification, which implies a reproduction of the elapsed portion of the consciousness lived during the foreground experience, replicating the previous perceptual activity. However, this appears to be incoherent with the constructive theories of episodic memory, which highlight how subjects shift perspectives in memory or include information not present in the foregoing experience. Thus, according to these contemporary theories, episodic memory is unlikely to imply a replay of the past conscious experience. I argue that if we investigate the embodied dimensions, then it is possible to reconcile the phenomenological approach and the constructive theories. More precisely, I ground the investigation on the analysis of operative intentionality and its role in comparing procedural and episodic memory. I argue that two embodied features qualify the reproductive modification of consciousness: the flexible re-enactment of the previous operative intentionality and the pre-reflective mode of embodied resonance with an agent I am no longer.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.00
自引率
8.70%
发文量
72
期刊介绍: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences is an interdisciplinary, international journal that serves as a forum to explore the intersections between phenomenology, empirical science, and analytic philosophy of mind. The journal represents an attempt to build bridges between continental phenomenological approaches (in the tradition following Husserl) and disciplines that have not always been open to or aware of phenomenological contributions to understanding cognition and related topics. The journal welcomes contributions by phenomenologists, scientists, and philosophers who study cognition, broadly defined to include issues that are open to both phenomenological and empirical investigation, including perception, emotion, language, and so forth. In addition the journal welcomes discussions of methodological issues that involve the variety of approaches appropriate for addressing these problems.    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences also publishes critical review articles that address recent work in areas relevant to the connection between empirical results in experimental science and first-person perspective.Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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