Tina Khezresmaeilzadeh, Elaine Zhu, Kiersten Grieco, Daniel J. Dubois, Konstantinos Psounis, David Choffnes
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Echoes of Privacy: Uncovering the Profiling Practices of Voice Assistants
Many companies, including Google, Amazon, and Apple, offer voice assistants
as a convenient solution for answering general voice queries and accessing
their services. These voice assistants have gained popularity and can be easily
accessed through various smart devices such as smartphones, smart speakers,
smartwatches, and an increasing array of other devices. However, this
convenience comes with potential privacy risks. For instance, while companies
vaguely mention in their privacy policies that they may use voice interactions
for user profiling, it remains unclear to what extent this profiling occurs and
whether voice interactions pose greater privacy risks compared to other
interaction modalities. In this paper, we conduct 1171 experiments involving a total of 24530 queries
with different personas and interaction modalities over the course of 20 months
to characterize how the three most popular voice assistants profile their
users. We analyze factors such as the labels assigned to users, their accuracy,
the time taken to assign these labels, differences between voice and web
interactions, and the effectiveness of profiling remediation tools offered by
each voice assistant. Our findings reveal that profiling can happen without
interaction, can be incorrect and inconsistent at times, may take several days
to weeks for changes to occur, and can be influenced by the interaction
modality.