买方福利最大化拍卖设计：评论

IF 0.6 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-08-19 DOI:10.1007/s00182-024-00904-4

Dmitriy Knyazev

{"title":"买方福利最大化拍卖设计：评论","authors":"Dmitriy Knyazev","doi":"10.1007/s00182-024-00904-4","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In an earlier paper published in this journal, Bauer (2023) claims to have constructed an auction format that maximizes buyers’ welfare. We note that the characterization of such a mechanism in Proposition 1 of Bauer (2023) is incomplete because it does not precisely specify the payment rule. Because of that, the discussion following this proposition is misleading and the mechanism proposed in the example is not incentive compatible. The complete characterization of the optimal mechanism is the one from Krishna and Perry (1998).</p>","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Buyers’ welfare maximizing auction design: comment\",\"authors\":\"Dmitriy Knyazev\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s00182-024-00904-4\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>In an earlier paper published in this journal, Bauer (2023) claims to have constructed an auction format that maximizes buyers’ welfare. We note that the characterization of such a mechanism in Proposition 1 of Bauer (2023) is incomplete because it does not precisely specify the payment rule. Because of that, the discussion following this proposition is misleading and the mechanism proposed in the example is not incentive compatible. The complete characterization of the optimal mechanism is the one from Krishna and Perry (1998).</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":14155,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Game Theory\",\"volume\":\"23 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Game Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-024-00904-4\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Game Theory","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-024-00904-4","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

鲍尔（Bauer）（2023 年）在本刊发表的一篇较早的论文中声称构建了一种能使买方福利最大化的拍卖形式。我们注意到，Bauer（2023）的命题 1 对这种机制的描述并不完整，因为它没有精确地说明支付规则。正因为如此，该命题之后的讨论具有误导性，而且示例中提出的机制与激励机制并不兼容。Krishna 和 Perry（1998 年）对最优机制进行了完整的描述。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Buyers’ welfare maximizing auction design: comment

In an earlier paper published in this journal, Bauer (2023) claims to have constructed an auction format that maximizes buyers’ welfare. We note that the characterization of such a mechanism in Proposition 1 of Bauer (2023) is incomplete because it does not precisely specify the payment rule. Because of that, the discussion following this proposition is misleading and the mechanism proposed in the example is not incentive compatible. The complete characterization of the optimal mechanism is the one from Krishna and Perry (1998).

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

International Journal of Game Theory 数学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

1.30

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

1 months

期刊介绍： International Journal of Game Theory is devoted to game theory and its applications. It publishes original research making significant contributions from a methodological, conceptual or mathematical point of view. Survey articles may also be considered if especially useful for the field.