依赖参考偏好的塔洛克竞赛

IF 1.7 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Economic Inquiry Pub Date : 2024-09-08 DOI:10.1111/ecin.13251

Francesco Fallucchi, Francesco Trevisan

引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了具有损失厌恶和内生参考点的塔洛克竞赛模型。在一个有 n 个可能是异质的参与者和凸努力成本的竞赛中，我们建立了在纯策略中唯一纳什均衡的充分条件。随后，我们分析了损失规避对玩家消费行为、获胜概率和租金耗散的影响。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

Tullock contest with reference-dependent preferences

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Tullock contest with reference-dependent preferences

We study the Tullock contest model with loss aversion and endogenously formed reference points. In a contest with n possibly heterogeneous players and convex effort costs, we establish sufficient conditions for a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Subsequently, we analyze the impact of loss aversion on players' spending behavior, probability of winning, and rent dissipation.

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来源期刊

Economic Inquiry ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.80

自引率

5.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Published since 1962, (formerly Western Economic Journal), EI is widely regarded as one of the top scholarly journals in its field. Besides containing research on all economics topic areas, a principal objective is to make each article understandable to economists who are not necessarily specialists in the article topic area. Nine Nobel laureates are among EI long list of prestigious authors.