{"title":"来自标准假设的对称和双 PRF:流行假设的通用验证","authors":"Mihir Bellare, Anna Lysyanskaya","doi":"10.1007/s00145-024-09513-6","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>A two-input function is a dual PRF if it is a PRF when keyed by either of its inputs. Dual PRFs are assumed in the design and analysis of numerous primitives and protocols including HMAC, AMAC, TLS 1.3 and MLS. But, not only do we not know whether particular functions on which the assumption is made really are dual PRFs; we do not know if dual PRFs even exist. What if the goal is impossible? This paper addresses this with a foundational treatment of dual PRFs, giving constructions based on standard assumptions. This provides what we call a generic validation of the dual PRF assumption. Our approach is to introduce and construct symmetric PRFs, which imply dual PRFs and may be of independent interest. We give a general construction of a symmetric PRF based on a function having a weak form of collision resistance coupled with a leakage hardcore function, a strengthening of the usual notion of hardcore functions we introduce. We instantiate this general construction in two ways to obtain two specific symmetric and dual PRFs, the first assuming any collision-resistant hash function and the second assuming any one-way permutation. A construction based on any one-way function evades us and is left as an intriguing open problem.\n</p>","PeriodicalId":54849,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cryptology","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Symmetric and Dual PRFs from Standard Assumptions: A Generic Validation of a Prevailing Assumption\",\"authors\":\"Mihir Bellare, Anna Lysyanskaya\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s00145-024-09513-6\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>A two-input function is a dual PRF if it is a PRF when keyed by either of its inputs. Dual PRFs are assumed in the design and analysis of numerous primitives and protocols including HMAC, AMAC, TLS 1.3 and MLS. But, not only do we not know whether particular functions on which the assumption is made really are dual PRFs; we do not know if dual PRFs even exist. What if the goal is impossible? This paper addresses this with a foundational treatment of dual PRFs, giving constructions based on standard assumptions. This provides what we call a generic validation of the dual PRF assumption. Our approach is to introduce and construct symmetric PRFs, which imply dual PRFs and may be of independent interest. We give a general construction of a symmetric PRF based on a function having a weak form of collision resistance coupled with a leakage hardcore function, a strengthening of the usual notion of hardcore functions we introduce. We instantiate this general construction in two ways to obtain two specific symmetric and dual PRFs, the first assuming any collision-resistant hash function and the second assuming any one-way permutation. A construction based on any one-way function evades us and is left as an intriguing open problem.\\n</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":54849,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Cryptology\",\"volume\":\"43 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Cryptology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"94\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-024-09513-6\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"计算机科学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, THEORY & METHODS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Cryptology","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-024-09513-6","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, THEORY & METHODS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Symmetric and Dual PRFs from Standard Assumptions: A Generic Validation of a Prevailing Assumption
A two-input function is a dual PRF if it is a PRF when keyed by either of its inputs. Dual PRFs are assumed in the design and analysis of numerous primitives and protocols including HMAC, AMAC, TLS 1.3 and MLS. But, not only do we not know whether particular functions on which the assumption is made really are dual PRFs; we do not know if dual PRFs even exist. What if the goal is impossible? This paper addresses this with a foundational treatment of dual PRFs, giving constructions based on standard assumptions. This provides what we call a generic validation of the dual PRF assumption. Our approach is to introduce and construct symmetric PRFs, which imply dual PRFs and may be of independent interest. We give a general construction of a symmetric PRF based on a function having a weak form of collision resistance coupled with a leakage hardcore function, a strengthening of the usual notion of hardcore functions we introduce. We instantiate this general construction in two ways to obtain two specific symmetric and dual PRFs, the first assuming any collision-resistant hash function and the second assuming any one-way permutation. A construction based on any one-way function evades us and is left as an intriguing open problem.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Cryptology is a forum for original results in all areas of modern information security. Both cryptography and cryptanalysis are covered, including information theoretic and complexity theoretic perspectives as well as implementation, application, and standards issues. Coverage includes such topics as public key and conventional algorithms and their implementations, cryptanalytic attacks, pseudo-random sequences, computational number theory, cryptographic protocols, untraceability, privacy, authentication, key management and quantum cryptography. In addition to full-length technical, survey, and historical articles, the journal publishes short notes.