{"title":"首席执行官薪酬-绩效敏感性和薪酬运气与不对称","authors":"Yixi Ning, Bill Hu, Zhi Xu","doi":"10.1108/mf-04-2024-0313","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Purpose</h3>\n<p>This paper studies the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck as well as the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay in which good luck is rewarded but bad luck is not penalized symmetrically. We further explore the impact of the regulatory changes on executive compensation taking effect in the 2000s on CEO pay for luck and asymmetry.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Design/methodology/approach</h3>\n<p>In this study, we examine the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO compensation. The sample consists of DJIA component companies over a 71-year period from 1950 to 2020. CEO pay-performance sensitivity is measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Findings</h3>\n<p>We find that an increase in CEO pay-performance sensitivity as measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity leads to an increase in the degree of CEO pay for luck but tends to reduce the level of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, we find that the major pay-related regulatory changes in recent years have mitigated the degree of CEO pay for luck and pay asymmetry, in which CEO pay structure and the associated CEO pay-performance sensitivity are major mechanisms through which the regulatory changes take effect.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Research limitations/implications</h3>\n<p>Our findings provide empirical evidence supporting the argument that both optimal contracting and rent extraction should be considered as important determinants of CEO compensation.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Practical implications</h3>\n<p>When a firm designs the pay packages for its CEO to align CEO wealth to firm performance, CEO pay-performance sensitivity is expected to improve. However, the improved CEO PPS can also lead to an increased CEO pay for non-performance (Luck), which is an undesired outcome from the shareholder view. Therefore, a firm should thoroughly consider various advantages and disadvantages when compensating its top executives. Third, pay-related regulations have indeed achieved some intended outcomes such as the diminished pay for luck and asymmetry, but they also exacerbated the positive relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. It seems that executive pay-related regulations cannot achieve perfect outcomes without side effects. Continuous reforms and regulations on corporate governance should be a dynamic process under various changing situations.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Originality/value</h3>\n<p>This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck and asymmetry in several ways. First, our study is among the few studies empirically testing the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and pay for luck and asymmetry. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
目的 本文研究了首席执行官薪酬-绩效敏感度与首席执行官因运气而支付薪酬之间的关系，以及首席执行官薪酬的非对称基准，即好运气得到奖励，而坏运气没有受到对称惩罚。我们进一步探讨了 2000 年代生效的高管薪酬监管变革对首席执行官运气薪酬和非对称薪酬的影响。设计/方法/途径在本研究中，我们考察了首席执行官薪酬-绩效敏感度与首席执行官运气薪酬以及首席执行官薪酬非对称基准之间的关系。样本包括道琼斯工业平均指数（DJIA）成分股公司，时间跨度为 1950 年至 2020 年，共 71 年。研究结果我们发现，根据德尔塔和詹森-墨菲薪酬绩效敏感性衡量的 CEO 薪酬绩效敏感性的增加会导致 CEO 因运气而支付薪酬的程度增加，但往往会降低 CEO 因运气而支付薪酬的不对称程度。此外，我们还发现，近年来与薪酬相关的重大监管变化减轻了首席执行官的运气薪酬和薪酬不对称程度，其中首席执行官薪酬结构和相关的首席执行官薪酬-绩效敏感性是监管变化生效的主要机制。研究局限/意义我们的研究结果提供了经验证据，支持了应将最优契约和租金提取视为首席执行官薪酬重要决定因素的论点。然而，CEO 薪酬绩效敏感度的提高也可能导致 CEO 非绩效薪酬（Luck）的增加，这在股东看来是不希望看到的结果。因此，企业在对高管进行薪酬时应全面考虑各种利弊。第三，薪酬相关规定确实达到了一些预期效果，如减少了运气薪酬和不对称薪酬，但也加剧了 CEO 薪酬-绩效敏感性与 CEO 薪酬基准不对称之间的正相关关系。由此看来，与高管薪酬相关的法规不可能达到完美的效果而没有副作用。在各种不断变化的情况下，公司治理的持续改革和监管应该是一个动态的过程。 原创性/价值 本研究从几个方面为有关高管薪酬运气和不对称的文献做出了贡献。首先，我们的研究是为数不多的实证检验首席执行官薪酬-绩效敏感性与幸运薪酬和不对称薪酬之间关系的研究之一。我们发现，首席执行官薪酬-绩效敏感性往往会增加首席执行官的 "运气薪酬 "程度，但会降低首席执行官薪酬的非对称基准水平。这些发现部分支持了基于管理权力假说的租金提取理论，部分支持了最优契约理论。我们的研究结果证实，最优契约理论和租金提取理论对于解释 CEO 薪酬的实践和历史趋势都很重要。
CEO pay-performance sensitivity and pay for luck and asymmetry
Purpose
This paper studies the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck as well as the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay in which good luck is rewarded but bad luck is not penalized symmetrically. We further explore the impact of the regulatory changes on executive compensation taking effect in the 2000s on CEO pay for luck and asymmetry.
Design/methodology/approach
In this study, we examine the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO compensation. The sample consists of DJIA component companies over a 71-year period from 1950 to 2020. CEO pay-performance sensitivity is measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity.
Findings
We find that an increase in CEO pay-performance sensitivity as measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity leads to an increase in the degree of CEO pay for luck but tends to reduce the level of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, we find that the major pay-related regulatory changes in recent years have mitigated the degree of CEO pay for luck and pay asymmetry, in which CEO pay structure and the associated CEO pay-performance sensitivity are major mechanisms through which the regulatory changes take effect.
Research limitations/implications
Our findings provide empirical evidence supporting the argument that both optimal contracting and rent extraction should be considered as important determinants of CEO compensation.
Practical implications
When a firm designs the pay packages for its CEO to align CEO wealth to firm performance, CEO pay-performance sensitivity is expected to improve. However, the improved CEO PPS can also lead to an increased CEO pay for non-performance (Luck), which is an undesired outcome from the shareholder view. Therefore, a firm should thoroughly consider various advantages and disadvantages when compensating its top executives. Third, pay-related regulations have indeed achieved some intended outcomes such as the diminished pay for luck and asymmetry, but they also exacerbated the positive relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. It seems that executive pay-related regulations cannot achieve perfect outcomes without side effects. Continuous reforms and regulations on corporate governance should be a dynamic process under various changing situations.
Originality/value
This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck and asymmetry in several ways. First, our study is among the few studies empirically testing the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and pay for luck and asymmetry. We find that CEO pay-performance sensitivity tends to increase the degree of CEO pay for luck but reduce the level of asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. These findings partly support the rent extraction theory grounded on the managerial power hypothesis and partly support the optimal contracting theory. Our findings confirm that the optimal contracting theory and the rent extraction theory are both important for explaining the practices and historical trends of CEO compensation.
期刊介绍：
Managerial Finance provides an international forum for the publication of high quality and topical research in the area of finance, such as corporate finance, financial management, financial markets and institutions, international finance, banking, insurance and risk management, real estate and financial education. Theoretical and empirical research is welcome as well as cross-disciplinary work, such as papers investigating the relationship of finance with other sectors.
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