In the Shadow of Global Polycrisis: Consensus and Polarization in the 2023 Estonian and Finnish Parliamentary Elections

The beginning of the 2020s has been marked by a near global polycrisis (Lawrence et al., 2024). In addition to the global climate crisis brewing in the background, in 2020, the first global pandemic erupted, which pressured governments to take unprecedented measures and divided societies over social distancing measures and vaccination and disrupted global production and logistics chains and caused turbulence in demand and supply. In 2022, Russia launched full-scale war in Ukraine, which sent millions seeking refuge elsewhere in Europe, prompted unprecedented international economic sanctions on Russia and enhanced the military preparedness in most European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states. This also resulted in the rapid rise of energy prices and the danger of energy deficit, rise of inflation and interest rates.

Hence, the general elections in Estonia in March 2023 and Finland in April 2023 took place in a situation of heightened international, economic and societal tensions and the outgoing governments having mainly dealt with crisis governance rather than focusing on fulfilling their electoral promises. In addition, both election campaigns also bore marks of bloc politics, where an otherwise multi-party system becomes aligned in two major camps and the campaign becomes a referendum on the proposed policies of these two camps.

Whilst polarization – both affective and political – is very well documented in the United States, it is also making headways into European politics. Political campaign cultures and government–opposition relations are changing even in countries like Finland and Estonia, which have usually been characterized by notably low levels of polarization (Bettarelli et al., 2023; Nord et al., 2024). Previous research has suggested that after a crisis, voters are particularly attracted to the political rhetoric of the (extreme) right. For instance, after a financial crisis, extreme right-wing parties increase their vote share by 30 percent (Funke et al., 2016). Moreover, as Lisinska (2022) has noted, in times of crisis, when taking substantial measures is of particular importance, continued polarization often leads to democracy fatigue. Whilst Estonia and Finland have not faced democracy fatigue, it seems clear that following the turbulent times of the last decade have led both countries to unforeseen levels of polarization and emergence of populist right wing. Especially Finland has a long tradition of multiparty collaboration, having a history of coalitions including from left to right, but the consensus-oriented society has lately reformed towards bloc politics with strong divisions between political camps. This shift towards bloc politics has resulted in more pronounced ideological divides and a rise in populist rhetoric. The political landscape in both Estonia and Finland now reflects a growing fragmentation, where the emergence of right-wing populism signals a significant departure from the historical consensus-driven political culture.

Estonia and Finland are two neighbouring countries with traditionally different political standings and history. During the cold war, Estonia remained behind the Iron Curtain, whilst Finland was a neutral country. After Estonia regained its independence in 1991, it launched its (re)integration to the West, becoming a member of the EU in 2004 (which Finland had joined in 1995) and, in the same year, also joined NATO, whilst Finland remained neutral. Socio-economically, Finland is a Nordic welfare state, whereas Estonia has since its independence been a liberal welfare state. Despite their differences, Finland and Estonia share strong cultural roots (both speak a Finno-Ugric language, which differentiates them from both the Scandinavian and the Baltic countries) and have maintained a very amicable relationship.

Both countries have a parliamentary political system, where the government is formed based on the results of the parliamentary election (although Finland used a semi-presidential system until the 1990s and, unlike Estonia, still elects its president directly). The Estonian parliament Riigikogu has 101 seats and the Finnish Eduskunta has 200 seats. Both countries use a proportional voting system, where the country is divided into electoral districts (12 districts in Estonia and 13 districts in Finland). In both Estonia and Finland, votes are cast directly for the candidate and indirectly for the party (or electoral list). Whilst Finland also allows electoral alliances to compete in the elections, which are an attractive solution for smaller parties, Estonia allows only parties and single candidates to compete. In Estonia, the electoral threshold is at 5%.

In Finland, the mandates are distributed in each electoral district, using the d'Hondt method. In Estonia, the seats are distributed in three rounds: first, personal mandates are distributed to the candidates who pass the quota (all votes divided by number of mandates) in the electoral district. This is also the only chance for single candidates to enter the parliament. In the second round, district mandates are distributed between party lists, using the quota method whilst the party lists are reordered according to the share of votes each candidate earned. In the third round, compensation mandates are distributed, using closed national lists and the modified d'Hondt method. Both election systems slightly advantage the larger parties.

In the following, we will give an overview of the electoral event in both countries, including the core campaign topics and the election results and the implications on both the domestic and international and EU level. We show that whilst the global polycrisis raises similar issues in Estonia and Finland, they play out rather differently, even within the common trend of emergent polarization and block politics. In addition, the article also demonstrates how the times of polycrisis entail taking important political decisions in between-elections periods rather than arguing them out during the election campaign. Finland's snap accession to the NATO after decades of the neutrality doctrine is a particular case in point.

Whilst the elections in Estonia and in Finland took place at an internationally turbulent time, they did not play a significant transformative role, but rather cemented the status quo. In the coalition agreements, both governments agreed to continue supporting Euro-Atlantic integration, including EU and NATO membership (Government Office, 2023a).

According to Petteri Orpo's government programme, the EU is Finland's most important political and economic framework and value community. To negotiate the EU cleavage which ran between the members of the governing coalition (with the Finns Party adopting a soft Eurosceptic position), the government programme emphasized that developing the EU into a better and more functional union is in Finland's interest. However, the coalition programme did not elaborate on whether or how the EU should change. The primary objectives outlined for Finland's foreign and security policy were to safeguard Finland's independence and territorial integrity, prevent its involvement in military conflict and ensure the safety and well-being of its citizens. The European Union and NATO form the co-operative core of Finland's foreign policy. Whilst in the government, the Finns Party has softened its stance towards the European Union has softened. The Finns Party no longer seeks Finland's withdrawal from the European Union in its European Parliament election platform, whilst still in its 2019 European Parliament election program, the party stated that its long-term goal was an EU exit, either independently or as part of a broader coalition of EU-critical nations. This is in line with their decision to return to the ECR group in the European Parliament in 2023 after belonging to the ID-group in 2019–2023.

During the past decades, Finland has seen a paradigm change in foreign policy. Since WWII, Finland identified itself as a neutral Western country between the West and the Soviet Union. Since the Cold War ended and Russia opened, Finland continued the traditionally good relations with Russia, at the same time positioning itself as a militarily non-aligned European country. Yet the political leadership kept the door ajar for the NATO option, whilst the majority of the Finnish population was not willing to join. After February 2022 and the Russian hostilities towards Ukraine, the public opinion in Finland changed rapidly, and along with Sweden, Finland started a race towards NATO membership. Finland applied to join NATO on 18 May 2022, that is, 10 months prior to the election, and became a member on 4 April 2023, 2 days after the election, with both the outgoing and the incoming government supporting the membership. Whilst Finland's relationships with NATO and the United States was close already before, and the step to become a NATO member was not a large one, the rapid change in the foreign policy consensus was striking.

As a full member of the EU and NATO since 2004, Estonia continued on its Euro-Atlanticist integration course, which largely remained intact even during the Centre Party–EKRE–Fatherland government. However, the election partly functioned as a referendum on the government's policy of generous support to Ukraine, as Estonia had donated over 1% of Estonia's GDP in military aid to Ukraine and promised to increase the support after the election (Government Office, 2023b). It can also be seen as a referendum on the active public diplomacy of Kaja Kallas, who had been taking a notably active role in negotiating EU's joint response (European Parliament, 2022). Kallas had been advocating for the initiative of seizing Russia's frozen assets in the EU member states in order to finance Ukraine's victory (Bloomberg, 2023), which was in 2024 approved as a measure both on the national as well as the EU level. Furthermore, the Reform Party ministers encouraged NATO members to increase their defence spending and donate 0.25% of their GDP to Ukraine in order to win the war against Russia (BBC, 2024). The new government coalition formed in 2023 set defence and foreign policies as its priority, agreed to increase defence spending to 3% of GDP so as to develop various military capabilities and also advocate for raising the minimal level of defence spending from 2% to 2.5% of GDP across NATO. The Estonian government coalition also pledged to support the widening policies of the EU and NATO towards Eastern partnership countries and fostering the strategic partnership with the United States and co-operation with Nordic and Baltic countries (Government Office, 2023a).

The 2023 elections in Estonia and Finland happened in the midst of a polycrisis, which heightened societal tensions and forced outgoing governments to take important political decisions without having expressly requested mandate for this. As a result, the 2023 election took bloc politics and polarization along the liberal-conservative cleavage to a new level and were partly about claiming approval for decisions taken. This introduced bloc politics and referendum-type of campaigning in both countries, despite notable differences in the political cultures and ideological leanings in Estonia and Finland.

Whilst the electoral outcomes varied – in Finland, a right-wing conservative coalition was formed, whilst in Estonia, a socially liberal coalition rose to power – both election campaigns were marked by the populist radical right becoming a pivotal player that voters either support or vote against. In both countries, the voters are still alien to the notions of bloc and tactical voting and largely in the dark about coalition possibilities, which on the one hand can be a possible backstop to the political polarization but also disempowering to the people as the sovereign.

Whilst the elections took place also at an internationally turbulent time, these did not introduce notable changes to the foreign and defence policy status quo. Both countries are continuing on the Euro-Atlantic integration course, viewing NATO and the EU as the core defence, economic and political communities. In Estonia, the election functioned as a referendum on the Reform Party's pro-Ukraine policy initiatives, and the election in Finland confirmed support for the decision to join NATO 10 months before the election when the public opinion which changed rapidly from opposing NATO membership to supporting joining the defence alliance. This marked the end of decades long neutrality policy for Finland, though changed less in defence policy, where Finland was already collaborating closely with NATO.