有终端回报的静态努埃尔游戏

S. Mastrakoulis, Ath. Kehagias
{"title":"有终端回报的静态努埃尔游戏","authors":"S. Mastrakoulis, Ath. Kehagias","doi":"arxiv-2409.01681","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we study a variant of the Nuel game (a generalization of the\nduel) which is played in turns by $N$ players. In each turn a single player\nmust fire at one of the other players and has a certain probability of hitting\nand killing his target. The players shoot in a fixed sequence and when a player\nis eliminated, the ``move'' passes to the next surviving player. The winner is\nthe last surviving player. We prove that, for every $N\\geq2$, the Nuel has a\nstationary Nash equilibrium and provide algorithms for its computation.","PeriodicalId":501216,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Discrete Mathematics","volume":"83 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Static Nuel Games with Terminal Payoff\",\"authors\":\"S. Mastrakoulis, Ath. Kehagias\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2409.01681\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this paper we study a variant of the Nuel game (a generalization of the\\nduel) which is played in turns by $N$ players. In each turn a single player\\nmust fire at one of the other players and has a certain probability of hitting\\nand killing his target. The players shoot in a fixed sequence and when a player\\nis eliminated, the ``move'' passes to the next surviving player. The winner is\\nthe last surviving player. We prove that, for every $N\\\\geq2$, the Nuel has a\\nstationary Nash equilibrium and provide algorithms for its computation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501216,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - CS - Discrete Mathematics\",\"volume\":\"83 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - CS - Discrete Mathematics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.01681\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Discrete Mathematics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.01681","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

在本文中,我们研究的是努埃尔博弈(the Nuel game)的一种变体(the generalization of theduel),它由 $N$ 玩家轮流玩。在每个回合中,一个玩家必须向其他玩家开火,并有一定概率击中并杀死目标。玩家按照固定的顺序射击,当一名玩家被淘汰后,"棋局 "就会转移到下一名存活的玩家。获胜者是最后一个存活的玩家。我们证明,对于每一个 $N\geq2$,Nuel 都有静态纳什均衡,并提供了计算它的算法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Static Nuel Games with Terminal Payoff
In this paper we study a variant of the Nuel game (a generalization of the duel) which is played in turns by $N$ players. In each turn a single player must fire at one of the other players and has a certain probability of hitting and killing his target. The players shoot in a fixed sequence and when a player is eliminated, the ``move'' passes to the next surviving player. The winner is the last surviving player. We prove that, for every $N\geq2$, the Nuel has a stationary Nash equilibrium and provide algorithms for its computation.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信