{"title":"能源社区的动态净计量","authors":"Ahmed S. Alahmed;Lang Tong","doi":"10.1109/TEMPR.2024.3354162","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We propose a social welfare maximizing market mechanism for an energy community that aggregates individual and community-shared energy resources under a general net energy metering (NEM) policy. Referred to as Dynamic NEM (D-NEM), the proposed mechanism dynamically sets the community NEM prices based on aggregated community resources, including flexible consumption, storage, and renewable generation. D-NEM guarantees a higher benefit to each community member than possible outside the community, and no sub-communities would be better off departing from its parent community. D-NEM aligns each member's incentive with that of the community such that each member maximizing individual surplus under D-NEM results in maximum community social welfare. Empirical studies compare the proposed mechanism with existing benchmarks, demonstrating its welfare benefits, operational characteristics, and responsiveness to NEM rates.","PeriodicalId":100639,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation","volume":"2 3","pages":"289-300"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Dynamic Net Metering for Energy Communities\",\"authors\":\"Ahmed S. Alahmed;Lang Tong\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/TEMPR.2024.3354162\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We propose a social welfare maximizing market mechanism for an energy community that aggregates individual and community-shared energy resources under a general net energy metering (NEM) policy. Referred to as Dynamic NEM (D-NEM), the proposed mechanism dynamically sets the community NEM prices based on aggregated community resources, including flexible consumption, storage, and renewable generation. D-NEM guarantees a higher benefit to each community member than possible outside the community, and no sub-communities would be better off departing from its parent community. D-NEM aligns each member's incentive with that of the community such that each member maximizing individual surplus under D-NEM results in maximum community social welfare. Empirical studies compare the proposed mechanism with existing benchmarks, demonstrating its welfare benefits, operational characteristics, and responsiveness to NEM rates.\",\"PeriodicalId\":100639,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation\",\"volume\":\"2 3\",\"pages\":\"289-300\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10399844/\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10399844/","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We propose a social welfare maximizing market mechanism for an energy community that aggregates individual and community-shared energy resources under a general net energy metering (NEM) policy. Referred to as Dynamic NEM (D-NEM), the proposed mechanism dynamically sets the community NEM prices based on aggregated community resources, including flexible consumption, storage, and renewable generation. D-NEM guarantees a higher benefit to each community member than possible outside the community, and no sub-communities would be better off departing from its parent community. D-NEM aligns each member's incentive with that of the community such that each member maximizing individual surplus under D-NEM results in maximum community social welfare. Empirical studies compare the proposed mechanism with existing benchmarks, demonstrating its welfare benefits, operational characteristics, and responsiveness to NEM rates.