投票支持内幕交易监管。对知情和不知情交易者偏好的实验研究

IF 3.6 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107295

Dominik Schmidt , Thomas Stöckl , Stefan Palan

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引用次数: 0

摘要

资本市场经常对内幕交易进行监管，但这种监管是否符合交易者的偏好是一个未决问题。本研究以交易者的知情前景为条件，考察了他们的监管偏好。在 64 次公投中，交易者有 41 次（64%）决定反对监管。此外，交易者的知情前景也对公投结果产生了重大影响。在一群交易者没有机会获得内部信息的市场中，47% 的全民公投决定反对监管。而当所有交易者都有机会获得此类信息时，81%的人决定反对。个人投票结果显示，知道自己仍将一无所知的交易者在 69.27% 的情况下支持监管，而知情交易者仅在 8.33% 的情况下支持监管。可能知情也可能不知情的交易者在 33.33% 的情况下支持监管。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Voting for insider trading regulation. An experimental study of informed and uninformed traders’ preferences

Capital markets often regulate insider trading, but whether such regulation aligns with traders’ preferences is an open question. This study examined traders’ regulation preferences conditional on their prospects of becoming informed. Of 64 referenda, traders decided 41 (64%) against regulation. Moreover, traders’ prospects of becoming informed significantly impacted the outcomes of the referenda. In markets in which a group of traders has no chance of receiving inside information, 47% of the referenda are decided against regulation. When all traders could get such information, 81% are. Individual votes reveal that traders who know they will remain uninformed support regulation in 69.27% of the cases, while informed traders do so only 8.33% of the time. Traders who may or may not become informed support regulation 33.33% of the time.

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来源期刊

Journal of Banking & Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

6.40

自引率

5.40%

发文量

262

期刊介绍： The Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF) publishes theoretical and empirical research papers spanning all the major research fields in finance and banking. The aim of the Journal of Banking and Finance is to provide an outlet for the increasing flow of scholarly research concerning financial institutions and the money and capital markets within which they function. The Journal''s emphasis is on theoretical developments and their implementation, empirical, applied, and policy-oriented research in banking and other domestic and international financial institutions and markets. The Journal''s purpose is to improve communications between, and within, the academic and other research communities and policymakers and operational decision makers at financial institutions - private and public, national and international, and their regulators. The Journal is one of the largest Finance journals, with approximately 1500 new submissions per year, mainly in the following areas: Asset Management; Asset Pricing; Banking (Efficiency, Regulation, Risk Management, Solvency); Behavioural Finance; Capital Structure; Corporate Finance; Corporate Governance; Derivative Pricing and Hedging; Distribution Forecasting with Financial Applications; Entrepreneurial Finance; Empirical Finance; Financial Economics; Financial Markets (Alternative, Bonds, Currency, Commodity, Derivatives, Equity, Energy, Real Estate); FinTech; Fund Management; General Equilibrium Models; High-Frequency Trading; Intermediation; International Finance; Hedge Funds; Investments; Liquidity; Market Efficiency; Market Microstructure; Mergers and Acquisitions; Networks; Performance Analysis; Political Risk; Portfolio Optimization; Regulation of Financial Markets and Institutions; Risk Management and Analysis; Systemic Risk; Term Structure Models; Venture Capital.