{"title":"谁应为电子商务中的退货运费买单?平台、零售商还是消费者","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.ijpe.2024.109375","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In the realm of e-commerce, various return freight modes are available, such as platform-bearing return freight (PP strategy), retailer-bearing return freight (RP strategy), and consumer-bearing return freight (CP strategy). The return freight strategy adopted by platforms plays a crucial role in responding to consumer behaviors. To analyze how platforms determine the optimal return freight strategies, we examine a supply chain comprising a platform, a retailer, and heterogeneous consumers, employing a Stackelberg game model to capture their decision dynamics. Our findings suggest that the platform should opt for the PP strategy only when the product profit margin is relatively low. If the platform refuses to adopt the PP strategy, then the RP strategy is preferable when consumers face extremely high consumer return freight costs; otherwise, the CP strategy is the equilibrium result. We also prove that the selection of the return freight strategies leads to changes in the property of the equilibrium. Under the CP strategy, how the product fit probability affects the optimal price depends on the procurement cost; while under the RP and PP strategies, the optimal price decreases with the fit probability. Moreover, under the PP strategy, an increase in the product fit probability does not always benefit the platform. Further, our analysis reveals that, while the PP strategy can reduce the retailer’s risk, it might negatively impact supply chain performance, which implies that cost sharing in the supply chain does not necessarily lead to a higher channel profit. We also investigate how the platform’s return freight strategies affect consumer surplus and identify regions for Pareto improvement where all parties benefit from the PP strategy. Finally, by exploring extensions like positive salvage values, partial refunds, platform competition, and differentiated return freight costs, we confirm the robustness of our findings and unveil new insights.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":14287,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Production Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":9.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Who should pay for the return freight in e-commerce? Platforms, retailers or consumers\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.ijpe.2024.109375\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>In the realm of e-commerce, various return freight modes are available, such as platform-bearing return freight (PP strategy), retailer-bearing return freight (RP strategy), and consumer-bearing return freight (CP strategy). The return freight strategy adopted by platforms plays a crucial role in responding to consumer behaviors. To analyze how platforms determine the optimal return freight strategies, we examine a supply chain comprising a platform, a retailer, and heterogeneous consumers, employing a Stackelberg game model to capture their decision dynamics. Our findings suggest that the platform should opt for the PP strategy only when the product profit margin is relatively low. If the platform refuses to adopt the PP strategy, then the RP strategy is preferable when consumers face extremely high consumer return freight costs; otherwise, the CP strategy is the equilibrium result. We also prove that the selection of the return freight strategies leads to changes in the property of the equilibrium. Under the CP strategy, how the product fit probability affects the optimal price depends on the procurement cost; while under the RP and PP strategies, the optimal price decreases with the fit probability. Moreover, under the PP strategy, an increase in the product fit probability does not always benefit the platform. Further, our analysis reveals that, while the PP strategy can reduce the retailer’s risk, it might negatively impact supply chain performance, which implies that cost sharing in the supply chain does not necessarily lead to a higher channel profit. We also investigate how the platform’s return freight strategies affect consumer surplus and identify regions for Pareto improvement where all parties benefit from the PP strategy. Finally, by exploring extensions like positive salvage values, partial refunds, platform competition, and differentiated return freight costs, we confirm the robustness of our findings and unveil new insights.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":14287,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Production Economics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":9.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Production Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"5\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925527324002329\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"工程技术\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Production Economics","FirstCategoryId":"5","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925527324002329","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
Who should pay for the return freight in e-commerce? Platforms, retailers or consumers
In the realm of e-commerce, various return freight modes are available, such as platform-bearing return freight (PP strategy), retailer-bearing return freight (RP strategy), and consumer-bearing return freight (CP strategy). The return freight strategy adopted by platforms plays a crucial role in responding to consumer behaviors. To analyze how platforms determine the optimal return freight strategies, we examine a supply chain comprising a platform, a retailer, and heterogeneous consumers, employing a Stackelberg game model to capture their decision dynamics. Our findings suggest that the platform should opt for the PP strategy only when the product profit margin is relatively low. If the platform refuses to adopt the PP strategy, then the RP strategy is preferable when consumers face extremely high consumer return freight costs; otherwise, the CP strategy is the equilibrium result. We also prove that the selection of the return freight strategies leads to changes in the property of the equilibrium. Under the CP strategy, how the product fit probability affects the optimal price depends on the procurement cost; while under the RP and PP strategies, the optimal price decreases with the fit probability. Moreover, under the PP strategy, an increase in the product fit probability does not always benefit the platform. Further, our analysis reveals that, while the PP strategy can reduce the retailer’s risk, it might negatively impact supply chain performance, which implies that cost sharing in the supply chain does not necessarily lead to a higher channel profit. We also investigate how the platform’s return freight strategies affect consumer surplus and identify regions for Pareto improvement where all parties benefit from the PP strategy. Finally, by exploring extensions like positive salvage values, partial refunds, platform competition, and differentiated return freight costs, we confirm the robustness of our findings and unveil new insights.
期刊介绍:
The International Journal of Production Economics focuses on the interface between engineering and management. It covers all aspects of manufacturing and process industries, as well as production in general. The journal is interdisciplinary, considering activities throughout the product life cycle and material flow cycle. It aims to disseminate knowledge for improving industrial practice and strengthening the theoretical base for decision making. The journal serves as a forum for exchanging ideas and presenting new developments in theory and application, combining academic standards with practical value for industrial applications.