谁应为电子商务中的退货运费买单?平台、零售商还是消费者

IF 9.8 1区 工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL
Xu Wang , Yang Xu , Tsan-Ming Choi , Qiang Zhou
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在电子商务领域,有多种返程运费模式,如平台承担返程运费(PP 策略)、零售商承担返程运费(RP 策略)和消费者承担返程运费(CP 策略)。平台所采取的退货运费策略对消费者行为的响应起着至关重要的作用。为了分析平台如何确定最优退货运费策略,我们研究了一条由平台、零售商和异质消费者组成的供应链,并采用斯泰克尔伯格博弈模型来捕捉它们的决策动态。我们的研究结果表明,只有当产品利润率相对较低时,平台才应选择 PP 策略。如果平台拒绝采用 PP 策略,那么当消费者面临极高的消费者退货运费时,RP 策略是可取的;否则,CP 策略就是均衡结果。我们还证明,退货运费策略的选择会导致均衡的属性发生变化。在 CP 策略下,产品匹配概率对最优价格的影响取决于采购成本;而在 RP 和 PP 策略下,最优价格会随着匹配概率的增加而降低。此外,在 PP 策略下,产品匹配概率的增加并不总是有利于平台。此外,我们的分析表明,虽然 PP 策略可以降低零售商的风险,但可能会对供应链绩效产生负面影响,这意味着供应链中的成本分担并不一定会带来更高的渠道利润。我们还研究了平台的退货运策略如何影响消费者剩余,并确定了帕累托改进区域,在这些区域中,各方都能从 PP 策略中获益。最后,通过探讨正残值、部分退款、平台竞争和差异化退货运费等扩展问题,我们证实了研究结果的稳健性,并揭示了新的见解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Who should pay for the return freight in e-commerce? Platforms, retailers or consumers

In the realm of e-commerce, various return freight modes are available, such as platform-bearing return freight (PP strategy), retailer-bearing return freight (RP strategy), and consumer-bearing return freight (CP strategy). The return freight strategy adopted by platforms plays a crucial role in responding to consumer behaviors. To analyze how platforms determine the optimal return freight strategies, we examine a supply chain comprising a platform, a retailer, and heterogeneous consumers, employing a Stackelberg game model to capture their decision dynamics. Our findings suggest that the platform should opt for the PP strategy only when the product profit margin is relatively low. If the platform refuses to adopt the PP strategy, then the RP strategy is preferable when consumers face extremely high consumer return freight costs; otherwise, the CP strategy is the equilibrium result. We also prove that the selection of the return freight strategies leads to changes in the property of the equilibrium. Under the CP strategy, how the product fit probability affects the optimal price depends on the procurement cost; while under the RP and PP strategies, the optimal price decreases with the fit probability. Moreover, under the PP strategy, an increase in the product fit probability does not always benefit the platform. Further, our analysis reveals that, while the PP strategy can reduce the retailer’s risk, it might negatively impact supply chain performance, which implies that cost sharing in the supply chain does not necessarily lead to a higher channel profit. We also investigate how the platform’s return freight strategies affect consumer surplus and identify regions for Pareto improvement where all parties benefit from the PP strategy. Finally, by exploring extensions like positive salvage values, partial refunds, platform competition, and differentiated return freight costs, we confirm the robustness of our findings and unveil new insights.

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来源期刊
International Journal of Production Economics
International Journal of Production Economics 管理科学-工程:工业
CiteScore
21.40
自引率
7.50%
发文量
266
审稿时长
52 days
期刊介绍: The International Journal of Production Economics focuses on the interface between engineering and management. It covers all aspects of manufacturing and process industries, as well as production in general. The journal is interdisciplinary, considering activities throughout the product life cycle and material flow cycle. It aims to disseminate knowledge for improving industrial practice and strengthening the theoretical base for decision making. The journal serves as a forum for exchanging ideas and presenting new developments in theory and application, combining academic standards with practical value for industrial applications.
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