通过部分细分市场分析进行战略性数据销售

IF 4.5 3区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Information Economics and Policy Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2024.101102

Flavio Delbono , Carlo Reggiani , Luca Sandrini

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们分析了当只有一小部分消费者（以一家公司为中心，我们称之为 "中心 "公司）的数据被分析时，数据经纪商出售消费者层面数据的动机，这些数据可以实现个性化定价，从而与公司竞争。与竞争对手（"外围"）相比，中心公司有可能从数据中获益更多。我们的研究表明，数据经纪人可能决定不向中心公司出售数据集，而是与其外围竞争对手进行交易。特别是，我们发现了竞争对手的一种战略反应，他们希望阻止数据增加竞争。

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Strategic data sales with partial segment profiling

We analyse the incentives of a data broker to sell consumer-level data that enable personalised pricing to compete with firms when only a fraction of consumers — centred around one firm that we label “central” — are profiled. The central firm can potentially benefit from the data more than the rival ones (“peripheral”). We show that the data broker may decide not to sell the dataset to the central firm and instead trade with its peripheral competitors. In particular, we identify a strategic reaction of competitors that want to prevent that data increase competition.

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来源期刊

Information Economics and Policy ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

5.00

自引率

10.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： IEP is an international journal that aims to publish peer-reviewed policy-oriented research about the production, distribution and use of information, including these subjects: the economics of the telecommunications, mass media, and other information industries, the economics of innovation and intellectual property, the role of information in economic development, and the role of information and information technology in the functioning of markets. The purpose of the journal is to provide an interdisciplinary and international forum for theoretical and empirical research that addresses the needs of other researchers, government, and professionals who are involved in the policy-making process. IEP publishes research papers, short contributions, and surveys.