按需服务平台中的客户和供应商有界理性

IF 6 2区 管理学 Q1 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Danna Chen , Yong-Wu Zhou , Xiaogang Lin , Kangning Jin
{"title":"按需服务平台中的客户和供应商有界理性","authors":"Danna Chen ,&nbsp;Yong-Wu Zhou ,&nbsp;Xiaogang Lin ,&nbsp;Kangning Jin","doi":"10.1016/j.ejor.2024.08.013","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The growing literature on operations management in the context of the sharing economy typically assumes that both customers and providers are fully rational. In contrast, we consider an on-demand service platform (e.g., Didi and Uber) with boundedly rational customers and providers that sets a price charged to customers and a wage paid to providers. Both customers and providers are sensitive to the payment terms set by the platform and also to congestion in the system (given by the relative numbers of available customers and providers in the market). We capture bounded rationality using a model in which customers and providers are incapable of accurately estimating the congestion level. We examine the impact of bounded rationality on the platform profit, consumer surplus, and labor welfare. We find that both customers’ and providers’ bounded rationalities may benefit the platform. Specifically, when customers’ or providers’ bounded rationality level and service valuation are relatively large or the valuation is relatively small, more irrational customers or providers increases the platform’s profit. Moreover, we find that the platform can exploit the bounded rationality differences between customers and providers to gain profit. Counterintuitively, we also demonstrate that the high bounded rationality of customers or providers may increase consumer surplus and/or labor welfare. Finally, bounded rationality on one side (e.g., customer side) can make bounded rationality on the other side (e.g., provider side) more likely to increase the platform’s profit, consumer surplus, or labor welfare under certain conditions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":55161,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Operational Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Customer and provider bounded rationality in on-demand service platforms\",\"authors\":\"Danna Chen ,&nbsp;Yong-Wu Zhou ,&nbsp;Xiaogang Lin ,&nbsp;Kangning Jin\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.ejor.2024.08.013\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>The growing literature on operations management in the context of the sharing economy typically assumes that both customers and providers are fully rational. In contrast, we consider an on-demand service platform (e.g., Didi and Uber) with boundedly rational customers and providers that sets a price charged to customers and a wage paid to providers. Both customers and providers are sensitive to the payment terms set by the platform and also to congestion in the system (given by the relative numbers of available customers and providers in the market). We capture bounded rationality using a model in which customers and providers are incapable of accurately estimating the congestion level. We examine the impact of bounded rationality on the platform profit, consumer surplus, and labor welfare. We find that both customers’ and providers’ bounded rationalities may benefit the platform. Specifically, when customers’ or providers’ bounded rationality level and service valuation are relatively large or the valuation is relatively small, more irrational customers or providers increases the platform’s profit. Moreover, we find that the platform can exploit the bounded rationality differences between customers and providers to gain profit. Counterintuitively, we also demonstrate that the high bounded rationality of customers or providers may increase consumer surplus and/or labor welfare. Finally, bounded rationality on one side (e.g., customer side) can make bounded rationality on the other side (e.g., provider side) more likely to increase the platform’s profit, consumer surplus, or labor welfare under certain conditions.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":55161,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"European Journal of Operational Research\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":6.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"European Journal of Operational Research\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221724006362\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Journal of Operational Research","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221724006362","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

有关共享经济背景下运营管理的文献越来越多,这些文献通常假设客户和供应商都是完全理性的。相比之下,我们考虑的是一个按需服务平台(如滴滴和优步),它的客户和提供者都是有界理性的,平台会设定向客户收取的价格和向提供者支付的工资。客户和提供商都对平台设定的付款条件以及系统拥堵(由市场上可用客户和提供商的相对数量决定)很敏感。我们使用一个客户和提供商都无法准确估计拥堵程度的模型来捕捉有界理性。我们研究了有界理性对平台利润、消费者剩余和劳动力福利的影响。我们发现,客户和提供商的有界理性都可能使平台受益。具体来说,当客户或供应商的有界理性水平和服务估值相对较大或估值相对较小时,更多的非理性客户或供应商会增加平台的利润。此外,我们还发现,平台可以利用客户和供应商之间的有界理性差异来获取利润。与直觉相反,我们还证明,客户或供应商的高度有界理性可能会增加消费者剩余和/或劳动福利。最后,在某些条件下,一方(如客户方)的有界理性会使另一方(如提供商方)的有界理性更有可能增加平台的利润、消费者剩余或劳动福利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Customer and provider bounded rationality in on-demand service platforms

The growing literature on operations management in the context of the sharing economy typically assumes that both customers and providers are fully rational. In contrast, we consider an on-demand service platform (e.g., Didi and Uber) with boundedly rational customers and providers that sets a price charged to customers and a wage paid to providers. Both customers and providers are sensitive to the payment terms set by the platform and also to congestion in the system (given by the relative numbers of available customers and providers in the market). We capture bounded rationality using a model in which customers and providers are incapable of accurately estimating the congestion level. We examine the impact of bounded rationality on the platform profit, consumer surplus, and labor welfare. We find that both customers’ and providers’ bounded rationalities may benefit the platform. Specifically, when customers’ or providers’ bounded rationality level and service valuation are relatively large or the valuation is relatively small, more irrational customers or providers increases the platform’s profit. Moreover, we find that the platform can exploit the bounded rationality differences between customers and providers to gain profit. Counterintuitively, we also demonstrate that the high bounded rationality of customers or providers may increase consumer surplus and/or labor welfare. Finally, bounded rationality on one side (e.g., customer side) can make bounded rationality on the other side (e.g., provider side) more likely to increase the platform’s profit, consumer surplus, or labor welfare under certain conditions.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
European Journal of Operational Research
European Journal of Operational Research 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学
CiteScore
11.90
自引率
9.40%
发文量
786
审稿时长
8.2 months
期刊介绍: The European Journal of Operational Research (EJOR) publishes high quality, original papers that contribute to the methodology of operational research (OR) and to the practice of decision making.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信