Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation coupled with ecological feedback compensation

A simple theoretical model (or a demonstrative example) was developed to illustrate how the evolution of cooperation can be affected by the density-dependent survival competition, in which we assume that the fertility of an individual depends only on the pairwise interaction between him and other individuals based on Prisoner’s Dilemma game, while its viability is only related to the density-dependent survival competitiveness. Our results show that not only cooperation could be evolutionarily stable if the advantage of cooperators in viability can compensate for the cost they pay for their fertility, but also the long-term stable coexistence of cooperation and defection is possible if none of cooperation and defection is evolutionarily stable. Moreover, for the stochastic evolutionary dynamics in a finite population, our analysis shows that the increase (or decrease) of the survival competitiveness of cooperators (or defectors) should be conductive to the evolutionary emergence of cooperation.