{"title":"社交网络上组合拍卖的元机制","authors":"Yuan Fang, Mengxiao Zhang, Jiamou Liu, Bakh Khoussainov","doi":"arxiv-2408.04555","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Recently there has been a large amount of research designing mechanisms for\nauction scenarios where the bidders are connected in a social network.\nDifferent from the existing studies in this field that focus on specific\nauction scenarios e.g. single-unit auction and multi-unit auction, this paper\nconsiders the following question: is it possible to design a scheme that, given\na classical auction scenario and a mechanism $\\tilde{\\mathcal{M}}$ suited for\nit, produces a mechanism in the network setting that preserves the key\nproperties of $\\tilde{\\mathcal{M}}$? To answer this question, we design\nmeta-mechanisms that provide a uniform way of transforming mechanisms from\nclassical models to mechanisms over networks and prove that the desirable\nproperties are preserved by our meta-mechanisms. Our meta-mechanisms provide\nsolutions to combinatorial auction scenarios in the network setting: (1)\ncombinatorial auction with single-minded buyers and (2) combinatorial auction\nwith general monotone valuation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the\nfirst work that designs combinatorial auctions over a social network.","PeriodicalId":501316,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"77 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Meta-mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions over Social Networks\",\"authors\":\"Yuan Fang, Mengxiao Zhang, Jiamou Liu, Bakh Khoussainov\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2408.04555\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Recently there has been a large amount of research designing mechanisms for\\nauction scenarios where the bidders are connected in a social network.\\nDifferent from the existing studies in this field that focus on specific\\nauction scenarios e.g. single-unit auction and multi-unit auction, this paper\\nconsiders the following question: is it possible to design a scheme that, given\\na classical auction scenario and a mechanism $\\\\tilde{\\\\mathcal{M}}$ suited for\\nit, produces a mechanism in the network setting that preserves the key\\nproperties of $\\\\tilde{\\\\mathcal{M}}$? To answer this question, we design\\nmeta-mechanisms that provide a uniform way of transforming mechanisms from\\nclassical models to mechanisms over networks and prove that the desirable\\nproperties are preserved by our meta-mechanisms. Our meta-mechanisms provide\\nsolutions to combinatorial auction scenarios in the network setting: (1)\\ncombinatorial auction with single-minded buyers and (2) combinatorial auction\\nwith general monotone valuation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the\\nfirst work that designs combinatorial auctions over a social network.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501316,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory\",\"volume\":\"77 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.04555\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.04555","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Meta-mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions over Social Networks
Recently there has been a large amount of research designing mechanisms for
auction scenarios where the bidders are connected in a social network.
Different from the existing studies in this field that focus on specific
auction scenarios e.g. single-unit auction and multi-unit auction, this paper
considers the following question: is it possible to design a scheme that, given
a classical auction scenario and a mechanism $\tilde{\mathcal{M}}$ suited for
it, produces a mechanism in the network setting that preserves the key
properties of $\tilde{\mathcal{M}}$? To answer this question, we design
meta-mechanisms that provide a uniform way of transforming mechanisms from
classical models to mechanisms over networks and prove that the desirable
properties are preserved by our meta-mechanisms. Our meta-mechanisms provide
solutions to combinatorial auction scenarios in the network setting: (1)
combinatorial auction with single-minded buyers and (2) combinatorial auction
with general monotone valuation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work that designs combinatorial auctions over a social network.