社交网络上组合拍卖的元机制

Yuan Fang, Mengxiao Zhang, Jiamou Liu, Bakh Khoussainov
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引用次数: 0

摘要

最近,针对竞拍者在社交网络中相互连接的拍卖场景设计机制的研究大量涌现。与专注于特定拍卖场景(如单单位拍卖和多单位拍卖)的现有研究不同,本文考虑了以下问题:在给定经典拍卖场景和适合该场景的机制 $\tilde{mathcal{M}}$ 的情况下,是否有可能设计出一种网络环境下的机制,从而保留 $\tilde{mathcal{M}}$ 的关键属性?为了回答这个问题,我们设计了元机制,以统一的方式将机制从经典模型转换为网络机制,并证明我们的元机制保留了理想的属性。我们的元机制为网络环境下的组合拍卖场景提供了解决方案:(1)具有单一买方的组合拍卖;(2)具有一般单调估值的组合拍卖。据我们所知,这是第一部在社交网络上设计组合拍卖的著作。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Meta-mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions over Social Networks
Recently there has been a large amount of research designing mechanisms for auction scenarios where the bidders are connected in a social network. Different from the existing studies in this field that focus on specific auction scenarios e.g. single-unit auction and multi-unit auction, this paper considers the following question: is it possible to design a scheme that, given a classical auction scenario and a mechanism $\tilde{\mathcal{M}}$ suited for it, produces a mechanism in the network setting that preserves the key properties of $\tilde{\mathcal{M}}$? To answer this question, we design meta-mechanisms that provide a uniform way of transforming mechanisms from classical models to mechanisms over networks and prove that the desirable properties are preserved by our meta-mechanisms. Our meta-mechanisms provide solutions to combinatorial auction scenarios in the network setting: (1) combinatorial auction with single-minded buyers and (2) combinatorial auction with general monotone valuation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that designs combinatorial auctions over a social network.
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