对抗胁迫:美中战略竞争、中间技术陷阱和中国政府引导基金

Xuanming Pan, Liu Aiwen, Chen Zhenzhen
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摘要

本研究通过全球金融网络(GFN)和全球创新网络(GIN)的视角,探讨了中美战略竞争中可能出现的 "中间技术陷阱"(MTT)。通过理论分析、有理论依据的案例研究和深入访谈,我们详细研究了美国如何利用其在全球金融网络中的领先地位来影响中国在全球创新网络中的参与程度。我们的研究结果揭示了美国诱导中国参与 MTT 的三种策略:第一,利用美国私募股权和风险投资(PEVC)来增强其对中国的技术优势;第二,推动美国投资者退出中国的私募股权和风险投资市场,从而限制中国获得美国资本的机会;第三,诱导支持创新和全球业务的高级商业服务(ABS)停止或减少在中国的业务,从而增加创新的中介成本。尽管中国政府引导基金(GGFs)已设法部分缓解了美国PEVCs撤离造成的 "资金缺口",但它们尚未承担起美国PEVCs之前在GIF和GIN中扮演的中介角色。因此,我们的研究通过将创新和金融学术研究与金融国策联系起来,有助于更好地理解 MTT 并推动其理论发展。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Contesting coercion: U.S.-China strategic competition, the middle technology trap, and Chinese government-guided funds

This study examines the possible emergence of a Middle Technology Trap (MTT) in U.S.-China strategic competition through the lens of the Global Financial Network (GFN) and the Global Innovation Network (GIN). By conducting doctrinal analysis, theoretically informed case studies, and in-depth interviews, we offer a granular study into how the U.S. has been weaponizing its leading position in the GFN to affect China’s level of participation in the GIN. Our findings reveal three U.S. tactics to induce the MTT with China: first, leveraging U.S. private equity and venture capital (PEVC) to enhance its technology advantage over China; second, pushing U.S. investors to withdraw from China’s PEVC market, thereby restricting Chinese access to American capital; and third, inducing Advanced Business Services (ABS) supporting innovation and global business to cease or reduce their operations in China, thereby increasing intermediation costs for innovation. Although Chinese government-guided funds (GGFs) have managed to partially mitigate the “funding gap” from the departure of American PEVCs, they have yet to assume the brokerage role previously played by American PEVCs in both the GIF and the GIN. As such, our study contributes to a better understanding and theoretical advancements of the MTT by linking up the scholarship of innovation and finance with financial statecraft.

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