内幕交易限制的执行、投资者保护和创新

IF 1.5 3区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
D. Brian Blank, Jiawei Chen, Valeriya Posylnaya
{"title":"内幕交易限制的执行、投资者保护和创新","authors":"D. Brian Blank, Jiawei Chen, Valeriya Posylnaya","doi":"10.1111/jfir.12426","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement actions are intended to protect investors and limit expropriation by firm insiders, but these SEC actions could affect insiders' incentives to contribute to value‐enhancing activities. Therefore, we explore how corporate innovation and performance respond to insider trading restrictions imposed by regulators and firms. Using manually collected data on SEC indictments against corporate insiders, we document more innovative activity following external insider trading restrictions. External restrictions are also followed by higher corporate investment, capital access, and operating performance. Similarly, internal blackout restrictions to insider trading are linked to more innovation as well. We use SEC and congressional rule changes as quasi‐natural experiments resulting in shocks in enforcement and indictments for identification and inference. Our results suggest insider trading restrictions and enforcement actions affect subsequent firm activities and managerial decisions by protecting outside investment, resulting in more investment in innovation.","PeriodicalId":47584,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Insider trading restriction enforcement, investor protection, and innovation\",\"authors\":\"D. Brian Blank, Jiawei Chen, Valeriya Posylnaya\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/jfir.12426\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement actions are intended to protect investors and limit expropriation by firm insiders, but these SEC actions could affect insiders' incentives to contribute to value‐enhancing activities. Therefore, we explore how corporate innovation and performance respond to insider trading restrictions imposed by regulators and firms. Using manually collected data on SEC indictments against corporate insiders, we document more innovative activity following external insider trading restrictions. External restrictions are also followed by higher corporate investment, capital access, and operating performance. Similarly, internal blackout restrictions to insider trading are linked to more innovation as well. We use SEC and congressional rule changes as quasi‐natural experiments resulting in shocks in enforcement and indictments for identification and inference. Our results suggest insider trading restrictions and enforcement actions affect subsequent firm activities and managerial decisions by protecting outside investment, resulting in more investment in innovation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47584,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Financial Research\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Financial Research\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/jfir.12426\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Financial Research","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jfir.12426","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

美国证券交易委员会(SEC)的执法行动旨在保护投资者并限制公司内部人员的侵占行为,但这些执法行动可能会影响内部人员对价值提升活动做出贡献的积极性。因此,我们探讨了企业创新和绩效如何应对监管机构和企业施加的内幕交易限制。利用人工收集的美国证券交易委员会对公司内部人的起诉数据,我们记录了外部内幕交易限制后更多的创新活动。受到外部限制后,企业投资、资本获取和经营业绩也会随之提高。同样,对内幕交易的内部封锁限制也与更多创新有关。我们将美国证券交易委员会(SEC)和国会的规则变化作为准自然实验,通过执法和起诉的冲击来进行识别和推断。我们的研究结果表明,内幕交易限制和执法行动会通过保护外部投资来影响公司的后续活动和管理决策,从而导致更多的创新投资。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Insider trading restriction enforcement, investor protection, and innovation
US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement actions are intended to protect investors and limit expropriation by firm insiders, but these SEC actions could affect insiders' incentives to contribute to value‐enhancing activities. Therefore, we explore how corporate innovation and performance respond to insider trading restrictions imposed by regulators and firms. Using manually collected data on SEC indictments against corporate insiders, we document more innovative activity following external insider trading restrictions. External restrictions are also followed by higher corporate investment, capital access, and operating performance. Similarly, internal blackout restrictions to insider trading are linked to more innovation as well. We use SEC and congressional rule changes as quasi‐natural experiments resulting in shocks in enforcement and indictments for identification and inference. Our results suggest insider trading restrictions and enforcement actions affect subsequent firm activities and managerial decisions by protecting outside investment, resulting in more investment in innovation.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Journal of Financial Research
Journal of Financial Research BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Journal of Financial Research(JFR) is a quarterly academic journal sponsored by the Southern Finance Association (SFA) and the Southwestern Finance Association (SWFA). It has been continuously published since 1978 and focuses on the publication of original scholarly research in various areas of finance such as investment and portfolio management, capital markets and institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and capital investment. The JFR, also known as the Journal of Financial Research, provides a platform for researchers to contribute to the advancement of knowledge in the field of finance.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信