{"title":"不确定性条件下以批准为基础的委员会表决","authors":"Hariz Aziz, Venkateswara Rao Kagita, Baharak Rastegari, Mashbat Suzuki","doi":"arxiv-2407.19391","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study approval-based committee voting in which a target number of\ncandidates are selected based on voters' approval preferences over candidates.\nIn contrast to most of the work, we consider the setting where voters express\nuncertain approval preferences and explore four different types of uncertain\napproval preference models. For each model, we study the problems such as\ncomputing a committee with the highest probability of satisfying axioms such as\njustified representation.","PeriodicalId":501316,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Approval-Based Committee Voting under Uncertainty\",\"authors\":\"Hariz Aziz, Venkateswara Rao Kagita, Baharak Rastegari, Mashbat Suzuki\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2407.19391\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study approval-based committee voting in which a target number of\\ncandidates are selected based on voters' approval preferences over candidates.\\nIn contrast to most of the work, we consider the setting where voters express\\nuncertain approval preferences and explore four different types of uncertain\\napproval preference models. For each model, we study the problems such as\\ncomputing a committee with the highest probability of satisfying axioms such as\\njustified representation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501316,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory\",\"volume\":\"24 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2407.19391\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2407.19391","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We study approval-based committee voting in which a target number of
candidates are selected based on voters' approval preferences over candidates.
In contrast to most of the work, we consider the setting where voters express
uncertain approval preferences and explore four different types of uncertain
approval preference models. For each model, we study the problems such as
computing a committee with the highest probability of satisfying axioms such as
justified representation.