公告中的游戏:如何在乐观的区块链机制中减少系统损失

Siyuan Liu, Yulong Zeng
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引用次数: 0

摘要

公告游戏,即由公告者发布信息,并由验证者进行质疑,在现实世界的应用场景中非常普遍。验证者努力验证公告的有效性,成功挑战无效公告可获得奖励,而挑战有效公告则得不到任何奖励。我们提出了公告博弈的博弈论模型,以分析公告者和验证者的潜在行为。我们确定了所有纳什均衡点,并研究了不同纳什均衡点的相应系统损失。此外,我们还分析了纳什均衡下各种系统参数对系统损失的影响。最后,我们提出了优化机制以减少系统损失的建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Games in Public Announcement: How to Reduce System Losses in Optimistic Blockchain Mechanisms
Announcement games, where information is disseminated by announcers and challenged by validators, are prevalent in real-world scenarios. Validators take effort to verify the validity of the announcements, gaining rewards for successfully challenging invalid ones, while receiving nothing for valid ones. Optimistic Rollup, a Layer 2 blockchain scaling solution, exemplifies such games, offering significant improvements in transaction throughput and cost efficiency. We present a game-theoretic model of announcement games to analyze the potential behaviors of announcers and validators. We identify all Nash equilibria and study the corresponding system losses for different Nash equilibria. Additionally, we analyze the impact of various system parameters on system loss under the Nash equilibrium. Finally, we provide suggestions for mechanism optimization to reduce system losses.
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