The 2023 Cypriot Presidential Elections: Shifts in Domestic and Regional Dynamics

Like other conflict-affected states, the history of presidential elections in the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) is characterized by significant political tension centred around the Cyprus problem. The 1960 Constitution and London–Zurich agreements led to a dysfunctional and ‘quasi-state’ state (Constantinou, 2006), and the period from 1960 to 1963 exemplified the state's weaknesses and the negative impact of the Constitution (Emilianides, 2003, p. 175). Following the Greek junta coup in July 1974, Turkey invaded the island and continues to occupy 37% of its territory, resulting in a de facto division that remains to this day. Other pivotal events, such as the 1983 unilateral declaration of independence by Turkish Cypriots, resulting in the formation of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC), which remains unrecognized except by Turkey, further complicate the theoretical pursuit of a settlement based on a Bizonal Bicommunal Federation (BBF). Negotiations, despite their challenges, were always aiming for a commonly accepted BBF settlement. However, the situation deteriorated following the collapse of the Crans Montana talks in 2017 and was further worsened with Ersin Tatar's 2020 election, as the Turkish Cypriot narrative shifted towards a two-state solution and recognition of the ‘TRNC’, driven by Turkey's militarized foreign policy (Adamides, 2022a).

In 2003, the opening of the crossing points allowed for bicommunal interaction for the first time since 1974, and in 2004, Cyprus entered the European Union (EU), albeit divided and with the EU acquis only applying to the RoC government-controlled areas. In this historical context, it is worth noting the RoC's uniqueness in the EU as the only member state with a presidential system, whereby the President serves as both head of state and head of government. This dual role, particularly in the absence of a Turkish-Cypriot Vice President, limits the checks and balances, thereby granting the Cypriot President considerable power over domestic political affairs, surpassing that of any other EU leader (Ker-Lindsay, 2006).

Inevitably, the Cypriot political landscape, especially the presidential elections, has been dominated by the Cyprus problem (Adamides, 2020). Until the late 2000s, electoral decisions were influenced by the parties' stance on the Cyprus conflict, making it almost certain that only one of their candidates would become President, thus containing the emergence of independent candidates. However, over the past decade, culminating in the 2023 elections, voting behaviour shifted, with issues such as migration and the economy gaining importance and even surpassing the prominence of the Cyprus problem. This allowed for party competition on multiple issues where the traditional parties, burdened by corruption scandals and economic and societal challenges, are not necessarily able to prevail. New parties emerged focusing on change, equality, inclusion and anti-corruption. Except for the far-right party National People's Front [Ethniko Laiko Metopo (ELAM)], which focused on immigration, other parties competed on similar issues without fundamentally different positions, thus failing to convince a significant percentage of voters. The voter fatigue with traditional parties and the quest for change created opportunities for independent candidates and far-right parties, as evident in the 2023 Presidential and 2024 European Parliament elections. Indeed, the 2023 Cypriot presidential elections marked a significant shift in Cypriot politics. It was the first time, since Archbishop Makarios III in 1960, that a President was elected without the support of either of the two main parties, the centre-right Democratic Rally [Dimokratikós Sinagermós (DISY)] or the leftist Progressive Party of Working People [Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou (AKEL)]. Nikos Christodoulides, capitalizing on his popularity as former Minister of Foreign Affairs and leveraging public frustration with political parties, defeated the candidates of the two major Greek Cypriot political parties.

The focus of the new President must inevitably be on the domestic political challenges as well as the pressing regional security issues that shape the country's bilateral and regional relations. The progressing decoupling of Greco–Turkish relations from Cyprus, the deteriorating Cyprus–Russia relations and the regional instability present significant opportunities and challenges. Cyprus, part of the EU but not of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), faces hard and ongoing security concerns and always seeks a security provider. Although a probable Turkish veto makes NATO membership unlikely, Cyprus should pursue greater integration into the Western security framework, especially after the fallout with Russia after the 2022 Ukraine invasion. This strategic challenge has significant implications for Cyprus's security future, bilateral relations with NATO countries and the Eastern Mediterranean security architecture.

The article proceeds with an analysis of the results and factors behind Christodoulides' victory and its impact on the Cypriot political system, followed by the challenges and foreign policy opportunities deriving from the regional developments.

The 2023 elections were unique due to the candidates' affiliations, as only two of the six main candidates were party leaders (see Table 1). Fear of losing meant that Christodoulides, an official DISY member, chose not to oppose DISY's President, Neofytou, in internal party elections. Instead, he ran as an independent whilst maintaining his DISY affiliation. Despite serving in a DISY government for 9 years, Christodoulides received support from the centre parties, Dimokratikó Kómma (DIKO), Eniea Dimokratiki Enosi Kentrou (EDEK) and Dimokratiki Parataksi (DIPA), even though they had been very critical of the outgoing government.

On 12 February 2023, 72.45% of the registered voters participated in the presidential run-off election. Christodoulides won with 51.97% of the vote, defeating AKEL-backed Andreas Mavroyiannis, the former Chief Negotiator for the Cyprus problem. In the first round, Christodoulides outperformed both major party-supported candidates, importantly defeating DISY's leader Neofytou by nearly 6%, which meant that he received a significant share of DISY voters, as the votes from the centre parties – based on their 2021 voting power – were insufficient to push him to the second round (see Table 1 for party voting power). With Mavroyiannis as his second-round opponent, Christodoulides' victory seemed likely, as most Neofytou voters were expected to support him due to his party affiliation, as would almost all voters from the far-right party ELAM who were unlikely to vote for a leftist-backed candidate. This was indeed the case, as half of Neofytou and approximately 70% of ELAM voters supported him in the second round.

DISY's leadership frustration was manifested in a second-round call for a conscience vote between Christodoulides and Mavroyiannis. Supporting the AKEL-backed Mavroyiannis was ideologically difficult, as was supporting Christodoulides, who divided the party. Notably, prominent DISY members backed Mavroyiannis, which underscores the frustration with Christodoulides and the increasing comfortableness with voting for a leftist-backed candidate. However, this support did not sway the majority of DISY voters.

Christodoulides' victory had a strong ripple effect for both main parties. AKEL performed better than anticipated with Mavroyiannis, but still struggles to expand its base. The party's leadership failed to attract new voters, and this became more evident with the loss of one of the two MEP seats to a 24-year-old Youtuber in 2024 (see Footnote 2).

On the other hand, DISY spiralled into introspection, also resulting in leadership change, with Annita Demetriou, President of the House of Representatives and Vice President of DISY, assuming leadership in March 2023. Despite her popularity, the party still grapples with the defeat's consequences. DISY has positioned itself in opposition, but so far, not very convincingly. Furthermore, the party faces challenges from dissenters, especially those who move to the far right.

The 2023 second-round results indicate an interesting ideological comfort that would have been inconceivable a few years ago. There was relatively significant DISY voter support for the AKEL-backed candidate, reflecting both disapproval for Christodoulides and an unprecedented ‘ideological comfort’, which was further facilitated by the fact that both were key figures in the Cyprus problem negotiations and both favoured stronger EU and United Nations (UN) involvement. The 2023 elections provide a strong indication that the ideological gap between the two parties has narrowed, as have their positions on the Cyprus problem (Katsourides, 2024). This shift and narrowing of the ideological differences allow for more political opportunism and diminished party loyalty, thus challenging traditional election practices, including party coalitions, which may no longer suffice to elect the chosen candidate.

Finally, there is a noteworthy shift to the right. ELAM's presence is notable for narratives that have become increasingly more normalized, standardized and vocal, in line with European trends (Silver, 2022; Wodak, 2020). From 1.1% in 2011 to 11.2% in the 2024 European elections, ELAM is now the third strongest party, surpassing the threshold of what Georgiadou (2008, p. 38) called ‘protest collectors’. As Katsourides (2013) notes, ELAM, with close links to the Greek far-right party Golden Dawn, commenced its path to normalization by shifting from its overt racist and authoritarian rhetoric to a toned-down rhetoric following the conviction of Golden Dawn in 2020, allowing it to successfully integrate in the mainstream (Greek) Cypriot political arena. Its growth, at the expense of DISY, DIKO and smaller parties, has significant implications, and unless new far-right parties emerge to split the far-right votes, increased normalization and opportunistic behaviour from centre and centre-right dissidents will facilitate voter shifts towards ELAM.

The shift to the right is exacerbated by the migration crisis, which has even surpassed the Cyprus problem and the economy as the most pressing issue (Politis, 2024), unsurprisingly given that Cyprus had the highest number of first-time asylum applicants relative to its population in 2023, with 13 applicants per 1000 people, far exceeding the EU average of 2 per 1000 (Eurostat, 2024). The issue is further exacerbated as it is both securitized – as is the case in most cases in Europe – and linked to Turkey and the Cyprus problem, thus being framed as a national security threat.

Admittedly, the issue has received the necessary attention, leading, inter alia, to the creation of a Deputy Ministry for Immigration and International Protection in 2024. Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior's actions focused on reducing incoming immigrants, speeding up asylum application processes, increasing returnees and enhancing the hosting infrastructure (Ioannou, 2024). These measures, along with improved buffer zone monitoring and more effective implementation of the 2016 EU–Turkey refugee deal, led to an 85% reduction in sub-Saharan African migrants (Ioannou, 2024). Despite these efforts, asylum seeker numbers continued to rise, with most in 2024 being Syrians fleeing Lebanon, turning the issue into a regional one. This crisis created a need, but also an opportunity, for an upgraded EU regional role, leading to common visits by the President and the European Commission (2024) President, Ursula von der Leyen, with the Lebanese Prime Minister, Mikati, in May 2024, resulting in a €1 billion financial support package (2024–2027) to help stabilize Lebanon and ultimately prevent illegal migration flows and smuggling. Despite the positive efforts, the immigration narrative dominates the campaigns and political discussions and remains a persistently costly issue for both the government and the ‘soft opposition’ of DISY and AKEL, with ELAM being the only party benefiting.

The wars in Gaza and Ukraine, as well as the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, highlighted the regional instability and the risks for Cyprus as the closest EU member state to the turbulent region. At the same time, it allowed Cyprus to upgrade its role as a key regional EU member state and to become, as the President noted, the ‘EU lighthouse in this important and challenged region’ (Simerini, 2024).

Following the war in Gaza, the government has used its strategic location and good relations with regional actors (except Turkey) to initiate the Amalthea Initiative, a multinational humanitarian aid plan. Supported by the United States, EU and UAE, this initiative elevated Cyprus's regional importance and underscored the need to keep the country stable and safe. However, societal divisions will grow if the conflict persists, as parties like AKEL and EDEK oppose Israel and the United States, potentially challenging the President's foreign policy options. The leftist AKEL (2024) openly opposes Israel, noting that as a Party, it ‘[w]ill continue to stand against the State of Israel and the criminal Netanyahu in his criminal policy of genocide against the Palestinians’. EDEK holds a similar position, which complicates the President's foreign policy efforts as his domestic support lies primarily with the centre parties.

The war in Ukraine has also impacted Cyprus, further straining its relations with Russia. Cyprus's support for Ukraine and alignment with Western actions against Russia have facilitated a ‘de-Russification’ process. This shift has opened the door for deeper relations with the United States, resulting in the commencement of ‘Strategic Dialogue’ in 2024, aiming for deeper political and economic relations and enhanced security collaborations. More importantly, it led to the partial lifting of the arms embargo in 2020 and its full lifting in 2022. 4 In other periods, such developments would face strong domestic opposition primarily from the left and, to a lesser degree, the centre parties. However, the overwhelming EU hard stance on Russia, as well as the similarities of the situation with Cyprus, made it difficult for the leftist AKEL to support Russia, which facilitated the overall de-Russification process, which started in 2013 and grew stronger in 2022 (see, for instance, ProtoThema, 2024).

The 2023 results raised concerns as to whether Christodoulides would have a softer stance on Russia (Olympios, 2022). However, the circumstances were such that the westward option was easy and essentially the only choice, thus eliminating most of those concerns. Indeed, the new government continues from where the old one stopped, with clear evidence of an increasing US footprint in Cyprus with projects like CYCLOPS 5 and bilateral actions including the lifting of the arms embargo and agreements on defence co-operation programmes. These developments are unprecedented for the RoC.

The ‘de-Russification’ of Cyprus, in parallel with the pro-US initiatives, including in the defence sector, creates new opportunities for a more Eastern Mediterranean-focused and West- and EU-driven regional defence architecture. Although Cyprus is not a NATO member, the challenge of more security integration is not insurmountable. Closer relations with NATO, once a major taboo, are now infiltrating political discussions. Neophytou suggested that NATO's involvement in the Cyprus problem should be a strategic goal, despite Turkey's likely opposition.

That said, NATO remains polarizing, with AKEL and EDEK strongly opposing it. As AKEL's (2022) spokesperson noted, ‘AKEL's position is very clear and timeless. Cyprus should neither now, nor ever, join any military alliances, and particularly an aggressive military alliance such as NATO’. Indeed, AKEL's anti-American rhetoric remains convenient for uniting the shrinking leftist base. Despite the (diminishing) NATO opposition, the question of ‘who is the security provider’ for Cyprus persists, with no clear answer. The EU alone cannot fulfil this role for non-NATO Cyprus, as Article 42.7 (the mutual defence clause) of the Treaty on the EU (TEU) is insufficient (Adamides, 2022b), and all future governments, as long as the Cyprus problem remains unresolved, will inevitably have to address the issue of security. Furthermore, there are diplomatic implications that necessitate careful diplomatic management. Specifically, the US-oriented developments and the pro-Ukrainian stance of Cyprus have provoked significant Russian reactions. Russia's position in the United Nations Security Council is crucial, as are Russia's actions in the areas not under the control of the RoC. Evidence indicates that Russian people and capital moved from the RoC-controlled areas to the northern part of the island (Smith, 2023), and the upgraded consular services in the northern part of the island are witness to these changes. These developments are sensitive, and despite Russia's ongoing detachment, its societal influence must still be considered.

Lastly, the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons have forged regional collaborations and comfortable ‘quasi-alliances’, especially amongst Cyprus, Greece and Israel since 2011 (Tziarras, 2016). There were also hopes, albeit misplaced, that the hydrocarbons would incentivize the resolution of the problem. As Christou and Adamides (2013) note, energy will simply amplify existing securitized or desecuritized political relations. The US-mediated Israeli–Lebanese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) agreement renewed the hopes, but the 7 October 2023 terrorist attack and the ensuing war in Gaza redirected the attention away from hydrocarbons and regional relations. The potential for a broader conflict, particularly in Lebanon, poses risks of increased instability and significant migration flows. The situation negatively affects the regionalization efforts, which have been particularly advantageous for Cyprus. Maintaining the positive momentum of regional integration, exemplified by the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), will be a challenge for Cyprus. Regionalization was key for Cyprus; the more integrated the Eastern Mediterranean becomes, the more significant Cyprus's role will be for the West and neighbouring countries.

After decades of relative stagnation, the Cyprus problem entered a new dangerous phase, marked by escalatory actions in the Cyprus EEZ, the buffer zone [see, e.g., Associated Press (AP), 2023] and the closed city of Varosha. Under the leadership of Ersin Tatar following his victory in the 2020 Turkish Cypriot elections, the focus shifted from a BBF to a two-state solution, further reducing prospects for common ground, as he maintains the position that the BBF is ‘dead and buried’ after the Crans Montana deadlock (Kanli, 2020). To mitigate the regression rate, the UN Secretary General appointed Maria Angela Holguin Cuellar as his Special Envoy in Cyprus, an act that regenerated interest but not necessarily hopes. Indicative of the challenges ahead are Turkey's and the Turkish-Cypriot conditions for consenting to Cuellar's appointment. The first condition is that her mandate is limited to exploring whether common ground exists or not to start new negotiations, and the second is that the duration shall not exceed 6 months (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024). In this backdrop, President Christodoulides faces the task of re-energizing Cyprus settlement talks without appearing too consenting, as that would create domestic reactions by his own supporters.

The regional developments and the Cyprus problem are not heavily interlinked but are not completely independent either, as Turkey's regional hegemonic aspirations are partially linked to Cyprus. Turkey prioritizes a strong and undisturbed military presence in the northern part of Cyprus with naval and drone bases over a BBF solution, which would facilitate its regional influence (Adamides, 2022a). This more militarized approach inevitably reduces the prospects for a settlement, for mutually acceptable options or even for more normalized relations. However, unlike its relations with Cyprus, Turkey has an incentive to normalize relations with Greece to improve its struggling economy, mitigate its isolation in the Eastern Mediterranean and maintain the ‘door to the West’ open. Positive developments between Turkey and Greece are becoming more institutionalized following the 7 December 2023 Athens Declaration on friendly relations and good neighbourliness. These developments, however, also indicate a partial decoupling of Greco–Turkish relations from the Cyprus issue. Greece emphasizes its support for the RoC, but the Cyprus problem may become an issue that Greece and Turkey ‘agree to disagree’ on, sidelining it to avoid hindering their bilateral relations. Thus, Turkey might continue to challenge the Cypriot status quo, albeit not to the degree that would jeopardize the improvement of Greco–Turkish relations.

The RoC foreign policy must adapt to this decoupling and seek a common Greco-Cypriot strategy to capitalize on Greco–Turkish progress. The exclusion of the Eastern Mediterranean from Greco–Turkish negotiations simplifies decoupling, but it also creates a challenge for Cypriot decision-makers to prevent regression at home if there is no incentive to include Cyprus in the equation. A potential positive development would be what Tsakonas (2022) calls a new Helsinki agreement interlinking Cyprus, Greco–Turkish and EU–Turkish relations, which could create incentives to break the deadlock. It is crucial for the RoC government, together with Greece and the EU, to develop a common strategy vis-à-vis Turkey that would be mutually beneficial for all three states. Failure to do so would risk a non-positive decoupling, leading to long-term negative effects for Cyprus and a potential negative spillover in Greco–Turkish and EU–Turkish relations.

Domestically, Christodoulides' victory represents a significant shift in Cypriot politics, with implications for domestic political party dynamics. As a President without the support of one of the two major parties and with questionable duration for the support from any party, he will have to excel in navigating the internal party challenges, the growth of the far right and the anti-US opposition, all whilst leveraging the regional opportunities from the crises that can turn the Eastern Mediterranean into an even more unstable region.

The Cyprus problem has been a central issue and a key focus of presidential campaigns, but the prospects for settlement are narrowing. In the absence of settlement potential or due to the risk of further deterioration, there is a greater need for regional emphasis and greater EU involvement. Indeed, it is widely accepted in Cypriot politics that it is primarily the EU that offers potential for maintaining these prospects.

Thus, leveraging Cyprus's strategic location and turning the regional instability into an opportunity to enhance its role as a stabilizing force and as a credible crisis' management actor is one of the key goals of Cypriot foreign policy. Proving that Cyprus can be a security provider for the EU, not just a security seeker, has become a major aim for the government. If successful, the country's importance grows, and so does the need for external powers to pay attention to its stability. These developments are also an opportunity for the EU, by utilizing Cyprus, to highlight the Union's own geopolitical role in the region and become a future security provider. The EU's and United States's growing interest, coupled with the de-Russification process, allows for deeper Cypriot integration in the Western-viewed security architecture for the region. This also opens the door for more creative security solutions to the Cyprus problem that could potentially involve NATO and, thus, more acceptable options for all parties involved.