Challenges in Constructing Scientific Metaphysics: A Case Study of the Everettian Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

The article continues the debate about whether classical “pure” metaphysics can explain scientific theories or science can generate its own metaphysical concepts. Two camps have emerged in modern analytic philosophy. The “metaphysician” camp defends the metaphysics of science by arguing that the fundamental con­cepts of classical metaphysics can be enriched, illustrated, or justified by exam­ples from scientific theories. The “philosophers of science” camp views this as yet another invasion of metaphysics into their scientific territory. They advocate a scientific or naturalized metaphysics that strictly corresponds to modern scien­tific theories. Since the concept of possible worlds is a key element of main­stream analytic metaphysics, proponents of the metaphysics of science find it natural to appeal to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory. In turn, proponents of naturalized metaphysics often use popular metaphysical systems to justify the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. I will argue that the interpretation originally proposed by H. Everett remains only one of the on­tologies of quantum theory, and attempts by philosophers of science to build a metaphysical construct on its basis encounter serious difficulties.