平衡激励:高管薪酬与组织绩效之间的复杂动态关系

Xinglong Li
{"title":"平衡激励:高管薪酬与组织绩效之间的复杂动态关系","authors":"Xinglong Li","doi":"10.32629/memf.v5i3.2364","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the multifaceted impact of executive compensation packages on corporate performance, innovation, and ethical conduct. Utilizing agency theory and stakeholder theory, it explores how these packages motivate executives, align their interests with shareholders, and promote broader stakeholder engagement. Well-structured compensation packages enhance executive motivation, reduce conflicts, and foster innovation and social responsibility. Empirical evidence suggests a positive correlation between executive pay structures and firms' innovative output. However, potential pitfalls such as short-termism and unethical behavior necessitate a balanced approach. The study emphasizes the importance of designing compensation packages that drive performance, uphold ethical standards, and align with societal values. Through case studies and empirical research, it advocates for incentivizing executives based on both financial performance and ethical conduct.","PeriodicalId":210794,"journal":{"name":"Modern Economics & Management Forum","volume":" 16","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Balanced Incentives: The Complex Dynamic Relationship Between Executive Compensation and Organizational Performance\",\"authors\":\"Xinglong Li\",\"doi\":\"10.32629/memf.v5i3.2364\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This article examines the multifaceted impact of executive compensation packages on corporate performance, innovation, and ethical conduct. Utilizing agency theory and stakeholder theory, it explores how these packages motivate executives, align their interests with shareholders, and promote broader stakeholder engagement. Well-structured compensation packages enhance executive motivation, reduce conflicts, and foster innovation and social responsibility. Empirical evidence suggests a positive correlation between executive pay structures and firms' innovative output. However, potential pitfalls such as short-termism and unethical behavior necessitate a balanced approach. The study emphasizes the importance of designing compensation packages that drive performance, uphold ethical standards, and align with societal values. Through case studies and empirical research, it advocates for incentivizing executives based on both financial performance and ethical conduct.\",\"PeriodicalId\":210794,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Modern Economics & Management Forum\",\"volume\":\" 16\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Modern Economics & Management Forum\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.32629/memf.v5i3.2364\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Modern Economics & Management Forum","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.32629/memf.v5i3.2364","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本文探讨了高管薪酬方案对公司业绩、创新和道德行为的多方面影响。文章利用代理理论和利益相关者理论,探讨了这些一揽子方案如何激励高管、使他们的利益与股东保持一致,以及促进更广泛的利益相关者参与。结构合理的薪酬方案可以提高高管的积极性,减少冲突,促进创新和社会责任。经验证据表明,高管薪酬结构与企业的创新产出之间存在正相关关系。然而,由于存在短期行为和不道德行为等潜在隐患,因此有必要采取一种平衡的方法。本研究强调了设计薪酬方案的重要性,这些方案既能推动业绩,又能维护道德标准,还能与社会价值观保持一致。通过案例研究和实证研究,本研究主张根据财务业绩和道德行为对高管进行激励。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Balanced Incentives: The Complex Dynamic Relationship Between Executive Compensation and Organizational Performance
This article examines the multifaceted impact of executive compensation packages on corporate performance, innovation, and ethical conduct. Utilizing agency theory and stakeholder theory, it explores how these packages motivate executives, align their interests with shareholders, and promote broader stakeholder engagement. Well-structured compensation packages enhance executive motivation, reduce conflicts, and foster innovation and social responsibility. Empirical evidence suggests a positive correlation between executive pay structures and firms' innovative output. However, potential pitfalls such as short-termism and unethical behavior necessitate a balanced approach. The study emphasizes the importance of designing compensation packages that drive performance, uphold ethical standards, and align with societal values. Through case studies and empirical research, it advocates for incentivizing executives based on both financial performance and ethical conduct.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信