基于成本分摊和市场竞争的供应链企业绿色技术协同创新机制研究

Sustainability Pub Date : 2024-07-23 DOI:10.3390/su16156295
Yijing Zou, Dayi He, Ruiyu Sun
{"title":"基于成本分摊和市场竞争的供应链企业绿色技术协同创新机制研究","authors":"Yijing Zou, Dayi He, Ruiyu Sun","doi":"10.3390/su16156295","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Supply chain green technology collaborative innovation is an important means for enterprises to improve the greenness of their products. This paper takes supply chain green technology innovation collaboration as the research object and constructs a stochastic differential game model, which not only provides reference for enterprises to choose the optimal type of technology innovation by combining with their own characteristics, but also provides a reference for their innovation decision-making in different market competition environments. The study shows the following: (1) in green product innovation, the formation of the cost-sharing contract is less affected by the intensity of competition in the green market when the market preference for greenness is relatively low. Therefore, government subsidies become an important tool to effectively guide the market mechanism to achieve the desired goal. As market competition intensifies, manufacturers’ incentives to suppliers will shift from reducing costs to increasing demand. (2) In green process innovation, when the intensity of green competition is low and suppliers’ process innovation efficiency is high, manufacturers should bear more costs; when the market preference for greenness is low, the market competition is intense, and the suppliers’ process innovation efficiency is low, the suppliers should bear more costs to help the manufacturers gain more market shares. (3) When retailers’ preference for greenness is relatively low, the government subsidy becomes an important tool to effectively guide the market mechanism to achieve the desired goal. (4) When the retailer’s green promotion performance is higher than the manufacturer’s, the manufacturer should bear more green promotion costs; conversely, the retailer should bear more green promotion costs. (5) Over time, the marginal increase in price over the marginal increase in greenness helps stabilise price volatility, considering consumer preferences. Conversely, it helps to increase the average value of prices.","PeriodicalId":509360,"journal":{"name":"Sustainability","volume":"129 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Research on the Mechanism of Collaborative Innovation in Green Technology among Supply Chain Enterprises Based on Cost Sharing and Market Competition\",\"authors\":\"Yijing Zou, Dayi He, Ruiyu Sun\",\"doi\":\"10.3390/su16156295\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Supply chain green technology collaborative innovation is an important means for enterprises to improve the greenness of their products. This paper takes supply chain green technology innovation collaboration as the research object and constructs a stochastic differential game model, which not only provides reference for enterprises to choose the optimal type of technology innovation by combining with their own characteristics, but also provides a reference for their innovation decision-making in different market competition environments. The study shows the following: (1) in green product innovation, the formation of the cost-sharing contract is less affected by the intensity of competition in the green market when the market preference for greenness is relatively low. Therefore, government subsidies become an important tool to effectively guide the market mechanism to achieve the desired goal. As market competition intensifies, manufacturers’ incentives to suppliers will shift from reducing costs to increasing demand. (2) In green process innovation, when the intensity of green competition is low and suppliers’ process innovation efficiency is high, manufacturers should bear more costs; when the market preference for greenness is low, the market competition is intense, and the suppliers’ process innovation efficiency is low, the suppliers should bear more costs to help the manufacturers gain more market shares. (3) When retailers’ preference for greenness is relatively low, the government subsidy becomes an important tool to effectively guide the market mechanism to achieve the desired goal. (4) When the retailer’s green promotion performance is higher than the manufacturer’s, the manufacturer should bear more green promotion costs; conversely, the retailer should bear more green promotion costs. (5) Over time, the marginal increase in price over the marginal increase in greenness helps stabilise price volatility, considering consumer preferences. Conversely, it helps to increase the average value of prices.\",\"PeriodicalId\":509360,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Sustainability\",\"volume\":\"129 10\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Sustainability\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3390/su16156295\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Sustainability","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3390/su16156295","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

供应链绿色技术协同创新是企业提高产品绿色度的重要手段。本文以供应链绿色技术协同创新为研究对象,构建了随机微分博弈模型,不仅为企业结合自身特点选择最优技术创新类型提供了参考,也为企业在不同市场竞争环境下的创新决策提供了借鉴。研究结果表明如下:(1)在绿色产品创新中,当市场对绿色的偏好程度相对较低时,成本分摊契约的形成受绿色市场竞争强度的影响较小。因此,政府补贴成为有效引导市场机制实现预期目标的重要手段。随着市场竞争的加剧,制造商对供应商的激励将从降低成本转向增加需求。(2)在绿色工艺创新中,当绿色竞争强度低、供应商工艺创新效率高时,制造商应承担更多成本;当市场绿色偏好低、市场竞争激烈、供应商工艺创新效率低时,供应商应承担更多成本,以帮助制造商获得更多市场份额。(3)当零售商的绿色偏好相对较低时,政府补贴成为有效引导市场机制实现预期目标的重要工具。(4)当零售商的绿色促销绩效高于制造商时,制造商应承担更多的绿色促销成本;反之,零售商应承担更多的绿色促销成本。(5) 考虑到消费者的偏好,随着时间的推移,价格的边际增幅大于绿色程度的边际增幅,有助于稳定价格波动。反之,则有助于提高价格的平均值。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Research on the Mechanism of Collaborative Innovation in Green Technology among Supply Chain Enterprises Based on Cost Sharing and Market Competition
Supply chain green technology collaborative innovation is an important means for enterprises to improve the greenness of their products. This paper takes supply chain green technology innovation collaboration as the research object and constructs a stochastic differential game model, which not only provides reference for enterprises to choose the optimal type of technology innovation by combining with their own characteristics, but also provides a reference for their innovation decision-making in different market competition environments. The study shows the following: (1) in green product innovation, the formation of the cost-sharing contract is less affected by the intensity of competition in the green market when the market preference for greenness is relatively low. Therefore, government subsidies become an important tool to effectively guide the market mechanism to achieve the desired goal. As market competition intensifies, manufacturers’ incentives to suppliers will shift from reducing costs to increasing demand. (2) In green process innovation, when the intensity of green competition is low and suppliers’ process innovation efficiency is high, manufacturers should bear more costs; when the market preference for greenness is low, the market competition is intense, and the suppliers’ process innovation efficiency is low, the suppliers should bear more costs to help the manufacturers gain more market shares. (3) When retailers’ preference for greenness is relatively low, the government subsidy becomes an important tool to effectively guide the market mechanism to achieve the desired goal. (4) When the retailer’s green promotion performance is higher than the manufacturer’s, the manufacturer should bear more green promotion costs; conversely, the retailer should bear more green promotion costs. (5) Over time, the marginal increase in price over the marginal increase in greenness helps stabilise price volatility, considering consumer preferences. Conversely, it helps to increase the average value of prices.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信