民族文化和腐败对全球实际收益管理的影响

Chu Chen
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究以 27 个国家为样本,探讨了文化价值观是否会影响管理者的实际收益管理(REM)行为。结果表明,不确定性规避和个人主义可以解释不同国家在实际收益管理实践中的差异。在 Lewellyn 和 Bao(2017)研究的基础上,本文考察了文化维度是否会影响腐败与 REM 之间的关系。个人主义并没有明显缓和腐败与 REM 之间的关系。我还发现,不确定性规避与腐败之间的交互作用是负的,这表明在腐败程度较高的国家,不确定性规避的管理者不太可能管理收益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Role of National Culture and Corruption on Real Earnings Management Around the World
Using a sample from 27 countries, this study examines whether cultural values impact managers’ real earnings management (REM) behaviors. The results indicate that uncertainty avoidance and individualism can explain the variations in REM practices across countries. Building upon the study by Lewellyn and Bao (2017), this paper examines whether cultural dimensions influence the relationship between corruption and REM. Individualism does not significantly moderate the relationship between corruption and REM. I also find that the interaction between uncertainty avoidance and corruption is negative, indicating that uncertainty-avoiding managers are less likely to manage earnings in a country with a higher level of corruption.
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