Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Grzegorz Lisowski, Piotr Skowron, Stanisław Szufa
{"title":"参与式预算编制中的战略成本选择","authors":"Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Grzegorz Lisowski, Piotr Skowron, Stanisław Szufa","doi":"arxiv-2407.18092","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study strategic behavior of project proposers in the context of\napproval-based participatory budgeting (PB). In our model we assume that the\nvotes are fixed and known and the proposers want to set as high project prices\nas possible, provided that their projects get selected and the prices are not\nbelow the minimum costs of their delivery. We study the existence of pure Nash\nequilibria (NE) in such games, focusing on the AV/Cost, Phragm\\'en, and Method\nof Equal Shares rules. Furthermore, we report an experimental study of\nstrategic cost selection on real-life PB election data.","PeriodicalId":501315,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Multiagent Systems","volume":"88 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Strategic Cost Selection in Participatory Budgeting\",\"authors\":\"Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Grzegorz Lisowski, Piotr Skowron, Stanisław Szufa\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2407.18092\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study strategic behavior of project proposers in the context of\\napproval-based participatory budgeting (PB). In our model we assume that the\\nvotes are fixed and known and the proposers want to set as high project prices\\nas possible, provided that their projects get selected and the prices are not\\nbelow the minimum costs of their delivery. We study the existence of pure Nash\\nequilibria (NE) in such games, focusing on the AV/Cost, Phragm\\\\'en, and Method\\nof Equal Shares rules. Furthermore, we report an experimental study of\\nstrategic cost selection on real-life PB election data.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501315,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - CS - Multiagent Systems\",\"volume\":\"88 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-25\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - CS - Multiagent Systems\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2407.18092\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Multiagent Systems","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2407.18092","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Strategic Cost Selection in Participatory Budgeting
We study strategic behavior of project proposers in the context of
approval-based participatory budgeting (PB). In our model we assume that the
votes are fixed and known and the proposers want to set as high project prices
as possible, provided that their projects get selected and the prices are not
below the minimum costs of their delivery. We study the existence of pure Nash
equilibria (NE) in such games, focusing on the AV/Cost, Phragm\'en, and Method
of Equal Shares rules. Furthermore, we report an experimental study of
strategic cost selection on real-life PB election data.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
