{"title":"亚伯拉罕和西西弗斯故事中的希望(缺失","authors":"Gabriela Vičanová","doi":"10.1007/s11841-024-01030-0","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>When looked at under the perspective of hope, existential philosophers Albert Camus and Søren Kierkegaard are typically seen as inverted images of one another: Kierkegaard embraces hope, which for him is a religious sentiment that he describes at length in <i>Fear and Trembling</i> through the character of Abraham. Camus – on the other hand – rejects hope, seeing both Kierkegaard and Abraham as individuals who had committed what Camus terms a ‘philosophical suicide.’ Camus’ <i>The Myth of Sisyphus</i> can thus be understood as an answer to Kierkegaard’s Abraham: Sisyphus – unlike Abraham – is an individual who had accepted the absurd nature of the world, rejected hope, and thus achieved happiness. In my paper, I will argue that Camus’ criticism of Kierkegaard and of Abraham is not final – I will argue that Camus, in fact, sees hope as an existentially important phenomenon. I will show that Camus does not reject hope in <i>The Myth of Sisyphus</i> but that he merely <i>temporarily suspends</i> it, only to return to it in his later writings. <i>The Myth of Sisyphus</i> is therefore only one of the many ‘stages on life’s way,’ and I will argue that hope is an important aspect of human existence not only for Kierkegaard but also for Camus. That said, Camus’ understanding of hope will not be the same as Kierkegaard’s; hope will exist not in relation to God, but in a relationship with other human beings.</p>","PeriodicalId":44736,"journal":{"name":"Sophia","volume":"161 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Hope(lessness) in the Stories of Abraham and Sisyphus\",\"authors\":\"Gabriela Vičanová\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s11841-024-01030-0\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>When looked at under the perspective of hope, existential philosophers Albert Camus and Søren Kierkegaard are typically seen as inverted images of one another: Kierkegaard embraces hope, which for him is a religious sentiment that he describes at length in <i>Fear and Trembling</i> through the character of Abraham. Camus – on the other hand – rejects hope, seeing both Kierkegaard and Abraham as individuals who had committed what Camus terms a ‘philosophical suicide.’ Camus’ <i>The Myth of Sisyphus</i> can thus be understood as an answer to Kierkegaard’s Abraham: Sisyphus – unlike Abraham – is an individual who had accepted the absurd nature of the world, rejected hope, and thus achieved happiness. In my paper, I will argue that Camus’ criticism of Kierkegaard and of Abraham is not final – I will argue that Camus, in fact, sees hope as an existentially important phenomenon. I will show that Camus does not reject hope in <i>The Myth of Sisyphus</i> but that he merely <i>temporarily suspends</i> it, only to return to it in his later writings. <i>The Myth of Sisyphus</i> is therefore only one of the many ‘stages on life’s way,’ and I will argue that hope is an important aspect of human existence not only for Kierkegaard but also for Camus. That said, Camus’ understanding of hope will not be the same as Kierkegaard’s; hope will exist not in relation to God, but in a relationship with other human beings.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":44736,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Sophia\",\"volume\":\"161 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Sophia\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-024-01030-0\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Sophia","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-024-01030-0","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Hope(lessness) in the Stories of Abraham and Sisyphus
When looked at under the perspective of hope, existential philosophers Albert Camus and Søren Kierkegaard are typically seen as inverted images of one another: Kierkegaard embraces hope, which for him is a religious sentiment that he describes at length in Fear and Trembling through the character of Abraham. Camus – on the other hand – rejects hope, seeing both Kierkegaard and Abraham as individuals who had committed what Camus terms a ‘philosophical suicide.’ Camus’ The Myth of Sisyphus can thus be understood as an answer to Kierkegaard’s Abraham: Sisyphus – unlike Abraham – is an individual who had accepted the absurd nature of the world, rejected hope, and thus achieved happiness. In my paper, I will argue that Camus’ criticism of Kierkegaard and of Abraham is not final – I will argue that Camus, in fact, sees hope as an existentially important phenomenon. I will show that Camus does not reject hope in The Myth of Sisyphus but that he merely temporarily suspends it, only to return to it in his later writings. The Myth of Sisyphus is therefore only one of the many ‘stages on life’s way,’ and I will argue that hope is an important aspect of human existence not only for Kierkegaard but also for Camus. That said, Camus’ understanding of hope will not be the same as Kierkegaard’s; hope will exist not in relation to God, but in a relationship with other human beings.
期刊介绍:
Sophia is now published by Springer. The back files, all the way to Volume 1:1, are available via SpringerLink! Covers both analytic and continental philosophy of religionConsiders both western and non-western perspectives, including Asian and indigenousIncludes specialist contributions, e.g. on feminist and postcolonial philosophy of religionSince its inception in 1962, Sophia has been devoted to providing a forum for discussions in philosophy and religion, focusing on the interstices between metaphysics and theological thinking. The discussions take cognizance of the wider ambience of the sciences (''natural'' philosophy and human/social sciences), ethical and moral concerns in the public sphere, critical feminist theology and cross-cultural perspectives. Sophia''s cross-cultural and cross-frontier approach is reflected not only in the international composition of its editorial board, but also in its consideration of analytic, continental, Asian and indigenous responses to issues and developments in the field of philosophy of religion.