共同持股的非控股大股东能否有效监督控股股东？来自中国的证据

IF 1.8 4区经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

International Review of Finance Pub Date : 2024-07-03 DOI:10.1111/irfi.12463

Kai Wang, Lihong Wang

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引用次数: 0

摘要

以 2007-2020 年中国上市公司为样本，我们发现，共同持股的非控股股东（NCBs）可以对控股股东财务不当行为所反映的支配性所有者的自我交易行为进行有效监督。这种效应集中体现在国有企业中，尤其是只持有国有企业的共同非控股股东。最后，当企业拥有更多同行企业、共同非国有企业持有更多同行业企业、共同非国有企业面临更强的退出威胁或共同非国有企业持有较长的投资期限时，监督效应尤为明显，这表明共同所有权增强了非国有企业识别和遏制控股股东不当行为的动机和能力。

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Do non‐controlling blockholders with common ownership monitor controlling shareholders effectively? Evidence from China

Using a sample of Chinese listed firms during 2007–2020, we find that non‐controlling blockholders (NCBs) with common ownership can exert effective monitoring on dominant owners' self‐dealing behaviors captured by financial misconducts related to controlling shareholders. This effect is concentrated among state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), especially for the common NCBs holding only SOEs. Finally, the monitoring effect is particularly evident when firms have more peer firms, when common NCBs hold more firms within the same industry, when common NCBs exert stronger exit threats, or when common NCBs hold long investment horizons, indicating that common ownership enhances NCBs' incentives and abilities to identify and curb controlling shareholders' misbehaviors.

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来源期刊

International Review of Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

3.30

自引率

5.90%

发文量

期刊介绍： The International Review of Finance (IRF) publishes high-quality research on all aspects of financial economics, including traditional areas such as asset pricing, corporate finance, market microstructure, financial intermediation and regulation, financial econometrics, financial engineering and risk management, as well as new areas such as markets and institutions of emerging market economies, especially those in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, the Letters Section in IRF is a premium outlet of letter-length research in all fields of finance. The length of the articles in the Letters Section is limited to a maximum of eight journal pages.