模糊双矩阵游戏中风险规避的影响

Axioms Pub Date : 2024-07-11 DOI:10.3390/axioms13070469

Chuanyang Xu, Wanting Zhao, Zhongwei Feng

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在具有对称三角形模糊报酬的双矩阵博弈中，我们的研究定义了（α，β）-风险规避纳什均衡（（α，β）-RANE），并提出了其充分必要条件。我们的研究还讨论了双矩阵博弈中的(α, β)-RANE 和混合策略纳什均衡（MSNE）之间的关系，双矩阵博弈中有一个风险规避者 2 和一定的报酬。最后，考虑到具有 STFPs 的 2 × 2 双矩阵博弈，我们找到了博弈方 2 的风险规避水平提高对自己有利还是不利的条件。

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Impact of Risk Aversion in Fuzzy Bimatrix Games

In bimatrix games with symmetric triangular fuzzy payoffs, our work defines an (α, β)-risk aversion Nash equilibrium ((α, β)-RANE) and presents its sufficient and necessary condition. Our work also discusses the relationships between the (α, β)-RANE and a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) in a bimatrix game with a risk-averse player 2 and certain payoffs. Finally, considering 2 × 2 bimatrix games with STFPs, we find the conditions where the increase in player 2’s risk-aversion level hurts or benefits himself/herself.

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Axioms

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