{"title":"没有过上最好的生活","authors":"Guy Fletcher","doi":"10.26556/jesp.v28i1.3202","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n \n \n \nIn a recent paper, Michal Masny put forward a novel, interesting, theory of the goodness of a life: the Dual Theory. As Masny’s discussion demonstrates, the Dual Theory, if true, would have very significant implications for various issues related to the goodness of lives and for normative ethics. It is thus worthy of serious attention. In this paper, I first explain the Dual Theory and the motivation Masny provides for it. I then aim to show three general problems for the view. \n \n \n \n","PeriodicalId":508700,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy","volume":"64 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Not Living My Best Life\",\"authors\":\"Guy Fletcher\",\"doi\":\"10.26556/jesp.v28i1.3202\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n \\n \\n \\nIn a recent paper, Michal Masny put forward a novel, interesting, theory of the goodness of a life: the Dual Theory. As Masny’s discussion demonstrates, the Dual Theory, if true, would have very significant implications for various issues related to the goodness of lives and for normative ethics. It is thus worthy of serious attention. In this paper, I first explain the Dual Theory and the motivation Masny provides for it. I then aim to show three general problems for the view. \\n \\n \\n \\n\",\"PeriodicalId\":508700,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"64 10\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v28i1.3202\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v28i1.3202","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
In a recent paper, Michal Masny put forward a novel, interesting, theory of the goodness of a life: the Dual Theory. As Masny’s discussion demonstrates, the Dual Theory, if true, would have very significant implications for various issues related to the goodness of lives and for normative ethics. It is thus worthy of serious attention. In this paper, I first explain the Dual Theory and the motivation Masny provides for it. I then aim to show three general problems for the view.
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