基于图像的初始方法可加强直接互惠,促进合作演化

IF 0.8 4区 物理与天体物理 Q3 PHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY
Sunhee Chae, Hyeong-Chai Jeong
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引用次数: 0

摘要

社会困境中如何产生合作一直是进化博弈论的核心问题。传统研究将直接互惠和间接互惠划分为促进合作行为的不同途径。直接互惠取决于与同一个体的反复互动,而间接互惠则涉及利用其他参与者的行为信息。本研究调查了迭代囚徒困境框架中的策略演化,重点关注有限群体,并使用了改进的莫兰过程。考虑到与相同伙伴的重复相遇以及公共行动记录的可用性,我们探索了各种策略对鉴别者的有效性,以促进合作的出现。我们的分析表明,判别策略的表现顺序取决于合作的成本收益比。利用初次相遇的间接信息的判别策略通常优于其他策略,除非在收益大大超过成本的情况下,即传统的 "以牙还牙 "策略占上风的情况下。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Initial image-based approach may enhance direct reciprocity for cooperation evolution

Initial image-based approach may enhance direct reciprocity for cooperation evolution

The puzzle of how cooperation arises in social dilemmas has been a central question in evolutionary game theory. Traditional studies have delineated direct and indirect reciprocity as distinct avenues for fostering cooperative behavior. Direct reciprocity hinges on recurrent interactions with the same individual, whereas indirect reciprocity involves leveraging information about the conduct of other participants. This study investigates strategy evolution within the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma framework, focusing on a finite population and utilizing a refined Moran process. We explore the effectiveness of various strategies for discriminators, considering both repeated encounters with identical partners and the availability of public action records, to facilitate the emergence of cooperation. Our analysis reveals that the order of the performances of discriminator strategies depends on the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation. Discriminators utilizing indirect information from initial encounters generally outperform others, except in cases where the benefits significantly surpass the costs, a condition under which the conventional Tit-for-Tat approach prevails.

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来源期刊
Journal of the Korean Physical Society
Journal of the Korean Physical Society PHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY-
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
16.70%
发文量
276
审稿时长
5.5 months
期刊介绍: The Journal of the Korean Physical Society (JKPS) covers all fields of physics spanning from statistical physics and condensed matter physics to particle physics. The manuscript to be published in JKPS is required to hold the originality, significance, and recent completeness. The journal is composed of Full paper, Letters, and Brief sections. In addition, featured articles with outstanding results are selected by the Editorial board and introduced in the online version. For emphasis on aspect of international journal, several world-distinguished researchers join the Editorial board. High quality of papers may be express-published when it is recommended or requested.
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