{"title":"基于图像的初始方法可加强直接互惠,促进合作演化","authors":"Sunhee Chae, Hyeong-Chai Jeong","doi":"10.1007/s40042-024-01135-2","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The puzzle of how cooperation arises in social dilemmas has been a central question in evolutionary game theory. Traditional studies have delineated direct and indirect reciprocity as distinct avenues for fostering cooperative behavior. Direct reciprocity hinges on recurrent interactions with the same individual, whereas indirect reciprocity involves leveraging information about the conduct of other participants. This study investigates strategy evolution within the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma framework, focusing on a finite population and utilizing a refined Moran process. We explore the effectiveness of various strategies for discriminators, considering both repeated encounters with identical partners and the availability of public action records, to facilitate the emergence of cooperation. Our analysis reveals that the order of the performances of discriminator strategies depends on the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation. Discriminators utilizing indirect information from initial encounters generally outperform others, except in cases where the benefits significantly surpass the costs, a condition under which the conventional Tit-for-Tat approach prevails.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":677,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Korean Physical Society","volume":"85 6","pages":"525 - 533"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Initial image-based approach may enhance direct reciprocity for cooperation evolution\",\"authors\":\"Sunhee Chae, Hyeong-Chai Jeong\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s40042-024-01135-2\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>The puzzle of how cooperation arises in social dilemmas has been a central question in evolutionary game theory. Traditional studies have delineated direct and indirect reciprocity as distinct avenues for fostering cooperative behavior. Direct reciprocity hinges on recurrent interactions with the same individual, whereas indirect reciprocity involves leveraging information about the conduct of other participants. This study investigates strategy evolution within the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma framework, focusing on a finite population and utilizing a refined Moran process. We explore the effectiveness of various strategies for discriminators, considering both repeated encounters with identical partners and the availability of public action records, to facilitate the emergence of cooperation. Our analysis reveals that the order of the performances of discriminator strategies depends on the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation. Discriminators utilizing indirect information from initial encounters generally outperform others, except in cases where the benefits significantly surpass the costs, a condition under which the conventional Tit-for-Tat approach prevails.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":677,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of the Korean Physical Society\",\"volume\":\"85 6\",\"pages\":\"525 - 533\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of the Korean Physical Society\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"101\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40042-024-01135-2\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"物理与天体物理\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"PHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of the Korean Physical Society","FirstCategoryId":"101","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40042-024-01135-2","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"物理与天体物理","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"PHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Initial image-based approach may enhance direct reciprocity for cooperation evolution
The puzzle of how cooperation arises in social dilemmas has been a central question in evolutionary game theory. Traditional studies have delineated direct and indirect reciprocity as distinct avenues for fostering cooperative behavior. Direct reciprocity hinges on recurrent interactions with the same individual, whereas indirect reciprocity involves leveraging information about the conduct of other participants. This study investigates strategy evolution within the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma framework, focusing on a finite population and utilizing a refined Moran process. We explore the effectiveness of various strategies for discriminators, considering both repeated encounters with identical partners and the availability of public action records, to facilitate the emergence of cooperation. Our analysis reveals that the order of the performances of discriminator strategies depends on the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation. Discriminators utilizing indirect information from initial encounters generally outperform others, except in cases where the benefits significantly surpass the costs, a condition under which the conventional Tit-for-Tat approach prevails.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of the Korean Physical Society (JKPS) covers all fields of physics spanning from statistical physics and condensed matter physics to particle physics. The manuscript to be published in JKPS is required to hold the originality, significance, and recent completeness. The journal is composed of Full paper, Letters, and Brief sections. In addition, featured articles with outstanding results are selected by the Editorial board and introduced in the online version. For emphasis on aspect of international journal, several world-distinguished researchers join the Editorial board. High quality of papers may be express-published when it is recommended or requested.