探索非正统:适度直接控制隐性偏见

IF 1.8 Q2 PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY
Philip Mack
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引用次数: 0

摘要

哲学家们的共识是,间接控制是个人对内隐偏见唯一可信的控制类型。相比之下,对内隐偏见的直接控制被认为是不可信的。其理由有二。首先,直接控制容易受到反弹效应的影响。其次,内隐偏差的性质也否定了直接控制。本文一反流行的哲学共识,为直接控制辩护,反对否定直接控制。因此,我认为,反弹效应并不是一种对直接控制的击倒-拖垮现象。我进一步指出,哲学家们对反弹效应的看法有失偏颇,对它的表述也有不准确之处。我认为,这为发展一种温和的直接控制内隐偏见的观点开辟了一些空间。我所提出的观点植根于双系统理论以及实验社会心理学和神经科学的研究成果。综合来看,这些证据表明了两点:(1) 内隐偏见的本质并不总是意味着直接控制;(2) 对内隐偏见的适度类型的直接控制是可信的。最后,我提醒大家不要把间接控制当作控制内隐偏见的标准。间接控制是通过采取基于控制的干预技术来保证的。但有证据表明,这些方法的效果会随着时间的推移而减弱。不过,我并不建议放弃间接控制。相反,我建议将间接控制作为一种策略,与适度的直接控制一起使用,这样就不会切断任何改善途径。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Probing the Unorthodox: Moderate Direct Control over Implicit Bias

The consensus among philosophers is that indirect control is the only plausible type of control that individuals can exercise over implicit bias. By contrast, direct control over implicit bias is dismissed as implausible. It is dismissed on two grounds. First, direct control is susceptible to the rebound effect. Second, the nature of implicit bias belies direct control. This paper grates against the prevailing philosophical consensus by defending direct control against its dismissal. Accordingly, I argue that the rebound effect is not a knock-down-drag-out phenomenon against direct control. I further argue that philosophers have an unnuanced view of the rebound effect and represent it in ways that betray inaccuracies. I argue that this opens up some space to develop a moderate view of direct control over implicit bias. The view I develop is rooted in dual-system theory and the findings of experimental social psychology and neuroscience. Taken together, the evidence suggests two things: (1) the nature of implicit bias does not always belie direct control, and (2) that a moderate type of direct control over implicit bias is plausible. I end with a caution against treating indirect control as the standard-bearer for control over implicit bias. Indirect control is secured by undertaking control-based intervention techniques. But evidence suggests that the effects of these techniques fade over time. I do not suggest, however, that indirect control be jettisoned. Instead, I propose that it be used as a strategy along with moderate direct control such that no ameliorative avenue is foreclosed.

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来源期刊
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Review of Philosophy and Psychology PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY-
CiteScore
4.70
自引率
5.00%
发文量
60
期刊介绍: The Review of Philosophy and Psychology is a peer-reviewed journal focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive science. The aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics of mutual interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster interdisciplinary research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the mind, including the neural, behavioural and social sciences. The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical research as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance. It includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from leading authors together with articles answering a call for papers. The Review of Philosophy and Psychology is published quarterly and is hosted at the Jean Nicod Institute, a research centre of the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. It was formerly published as the "European Review of Philosophy" by CSLI Publications, Stanford.
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