{"title":"拍卖理论和人口学","authors":"O. A. Malafeyev, I. E. Khomenko","doi":"arxiv-2407.06248","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In economics, there are many ways to describe the interaction between a\n\"seller\" and a \"buyer\". The most common one, with which we interact almost\nevery day, is selling for a fixed price. This option is perfect for selling a\nmass product, when we have a number of sellers and many buyers, and the price\nfor the product varies depending on the conditions of the relationship between\nsupply and demand. Another situation meets us already in markets, where a\nproduct can be either mass-produced or more unique, so this option is already\ncloser to the object of our discussion.However, a one-on-one transaction is a\nmuch more unstable option, which is why it is also more difficult to model,\nsince it is determined not so much by algorithms as by psychology and the\ndifference in the bargaining ability of the two parties. An even closer example\nof an auction is price discrimination, when the price for the buyer is\ndetermined not only by supply and demand, but also by which group the buyer\nbelongs to. But in this case, the product is not unique, and the final seller\nis the only one. Thus, we have identified the main auction criteria and their\nfeatures of the \"game\".","PeriodicalId":501372,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - QuantFin - General Finance","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Auction theory and demography\",\"authors\":\"O. A. Malafeyev, I. E. Khomenko\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2407.06248\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In economics, there are many ways to describe the interaction between a\\n\\\"seller\\\" and a \\\"buyer\\\". The most common one, with which we interact almost\\nevery day, is selling for a fixed price. This option is perfect for selling a\\nmass product, when we have a number of sellers and many buyers, and the price\\nfor the product varies depending on the conditions of the relationship between\\nsupply and demand. Another situation meets us already in markets, where a\\nproduct can be either mass-produced or more unique, so this option is already\\ncloser to the object of our discussion.However, a one-on-one transaction is a\\nmuch more unstable option, which is why it is also more difficult to model,\\nsince it is determined not so much by algorithms as by psychology and the\\ndifference in the bargaining ability of the two parties. An even closer example\\nof an auction is price discrimination, when the price for the buyer is\\ndetermined not only by supply and demand, but also by which group the buyer\\nbelongs to. But in this case, the product is not unique, and the final seller\\nis the only one. Thus, we have identified the main auction criteria and their\\nfeatures of the \\\"game\\\".\",\"PeriodicalId\":501372,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - QuantFin - General Finance\",\"volume\":\"11 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - QuantFin - General Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2407.06248\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - QuantFin - General Finance","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2407.06248","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
In economics, there are many ways to describe the interaction between a
"seller" and a "buyer". The most common one, with which we interact almost
every day, is selling for a fixed price. This option is perfect for selling a
mass product, when we have a number of sellers and many buyers, and the price
for the product varies depending on the conditions of the relationship between
supply and demand. Another situation meets us already in markets, where a
product can be either mass-produced or more unique, so this option is already
closer to the object of our discussion.However, a one-on-one transaction is a
much more unstable option, which is why it is also more difficult to model,
since it is determined not so much by algorithms as by psychology and the
difference in the bargaining ability of the two parties. An even closer example
of an auction is price discrimination, when the price for the buyer is
determined not only by supply and demand, but also by which group the buyer
belongs to. But in this case, the product is not unique, and the final seller
is the only one. Thus, we have identified the main auction criteria and their
features of the "game".