自我威胁的勒索者是功利主义者的问题，而不是契约主义者的问题

IF 1 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2024-07-10 DOI:10.1007/s10677-024-10457-w

Robert Huseby, Sigurd Lindstad

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引用次数: 0

摘要

约翰-弗里克（Johann Frick）声称，道德要求我们（在许多情况下）应该满足那些试图通过威胁伤害自己来敲诈我们的理性主体（自我威胁敲诈者）的要求。他进一步指出，由于契约主义意味着不存在这样的道德要求，因此这种情况对这一道德理论品牌来说是个问题。在本文中，我们认为情况恰恰相反：道德并不要求我们屈服于自我威胁的勒索者的要求。因此，这种情况是（行为）功利主义的问题，而不是契约主义的问题。我们的论点诉诸于对理性行为者有特殊责任照顾自身利益或福利这一观点的特殊理解。

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Self-Threatening Extortionists Constitute a Problem for Utilitarians, Not Contractualists

Johann Frick has claimed that morality requires that we (in many cases) should give in to the demands of rational agents who attempt to extort us by threatening to harm themselves (self-threatening extortionists). He has further argued that since contractualism implies that there is no such moral requirement, such cases represent a problem for this brand of moral theory. In this paper, we argue that things are quite the other way around: Morality does not require that we give in to the demands of self-threatening extortionists. Such cases, therefore, represent a problem for (act) utilitarianism, rather than contractualism. Our argument appeals to a particular understanding of the idea that rational agents have a special responsibility to take care of their own interests or welfare.

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来源期刊

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

10.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Ethical Theory and Moral Practice is a double-anonymous peer-reviewed philosophical journal which aims to publish the best work produced in all fields of practical philosophy. It welcomes high-quality, rigorous and original, submissions regardless of the traditions or schools of thought from which they derive. As an editorial priority, however, published papers should be accessible to the philosophical community at large and as free as possible of unnecessary jargon. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice publishes work on ethical theories that address practical problems, as well as work that presents or examines empirical findings regarding moral practices relevant for ethical theorizing. The journal therefore actively seeks to promote cross-fertilization across areas of practical philosophy—such as moral, political, legal, and social philosophy—and more empirical disciplines, such as medicine, economics, sociology, political science, and psychology. It welcomes work in applied ethics provided that it can offer theoretical or normative contributions to larger philosophical debates. The journal also considers historically-oriented contributions provided they are not mainly exegetical and can offer insights for current debates in practical philosophy. The journal endorses the BPA/ SWIP-UK Good Practice for Journals. Further details are available in our Review Policy document.