{"title":"非确定性世界中的道德责任与时间旅行","authors":"Joshua Spencer","doi":"10.3390/philosophies9040096","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I have argued against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities using a time travel-based counterexample. Kelly McCormick has responded to my counterexample by arguing that the time travel scenario must be a scenario in which a time traveler’s actions are causally determined; hence, she claims, we should be suspicious of attributing moral responsibility to anyone in such a scenario. In this paper, I respond by arguing that one might be morally responsible in an indeterministic time travel scenario.","PeriodicalId":31446,"journal":{"name":"Philosophies","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Moral Responsibility and Time Travel in an Indeterministic World\",\"authors\":\"Joshua Spencer\",\"doi\":\"10.3390/philosophies9040096\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"I have argued against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities using a time travel-based counterexample. Kelly McCormick has responded to my counterexample by arguing that the time travel scenario must be a scenario in which a time traveler’s actions are causally determined; hence, she claims, we should be suspicious of attributing moral responsibility to anyone in such a scenario. In this paper, I respond by arguing that one might be morally responsible in an indeterministic time travel scenario.\",\"PeriodicalId\":31446,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophies\",\"volume\":\"41 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040096\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040096","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Moral Responsibility and Time Travel in an Indeterministic World
I have argued against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities using a time travel-based counterexample. Kelly McCormick has responded to my counterexample by arguing that the time travel scenario must be a scenario in which a time traveler’s actions are causally determined; hence, she claims, we should be suspicious of attributing moral responsibility to anyone in such a scenario. In this paper, I respond by arguing that one might be morally responsible in an indeterministic time travel scenario.
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