属性误报和评估偏差

IF 5.6 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Michael D Eriksen, Chun Kuang, Wenyu Zhu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们收集了 2013 年至 2017 年与 460 万份贷款申请相关的估价师报告属性的财产级面板,以检验属性报告是否一致。估价师有动机虚报房产属性,以证明较高的估价是合理的,从而确保相关抵押贷款获得批准。我们重点研究了同一估价师在 4 个季度内报告了多组属性的房产交易,发现了与通过属性误报抬高估值的意图一致的证据。我们发现,策略性的属性误报在各个市场都很普遍,评估报告属性不一致的高杠杆借款人严重拖欠贷款的可能性要高出 9.8%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Attribute Misreporting and Appraisal Bias
We assemble a property-level panel of appraiser-reported attributes associated with 4.6 million loan applications from 2013 to 2017 to test whether attributes were consistently reported. Appraisers have an incentive to misreport property attributes to justify higher appraised values to ensure associated mortgage loans are approved. We focus on property transactions with multiple sets of attributes reported by the same appraiser within 4 quarters and find evidence consistent with an intent to inflate valuations through attribute misreporting. We find that strategic misreporting of attributes is prevalent across markets, and that highly leveraged borrowers whose appraisals had inconsistently reported attributes were 9.8% more likely to become seriously delinquent in their loan payments.
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来源期刊
Review of Finance
Review of Finance Multiple-
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
2.30%
发文量
67
期刊介绍: The Review of Finance, the official journal of the European Finance Association, aims at a wide circulation and visibility in the finance profession. The journal publishes high-quality papers in all areas of financial economics, both established and newly developing fields: • •Asset pricing •Corporate finance •Banking and market microstructure •Law and finance •Behavioral finance •Experimental finance Review of Finance occasionally publishes special issues on timely topics, including selected papers presented at the meetings of the European Finance Association or at other selected conferences in the field.
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