Ryan Christopher Polk, Steve Buchheit, Mark E. Riley, Mary S. Stone
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The authors corroborate prior results under the historic 10-day maximum reporting regime and provide updated academic analysis regarding how the five-day deadline between the “triggering” event, accumulating 5% of the outstanding shares and public disclosure of that event will affect abnormal returns.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Design/methodology/approach</h3>\n<p>This empirical archival study uses publicly available data.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Findings</h3>\n<p>The analyses show that changing from a 10-day to a 5-day Schedule 13 disclosure window will reduce activist investors’ opportunity to profit by legally delaying the filing of Schedule 13D. These excess returns for delay exist regardless of the profitability or size of the target firm or the shareholder’s disclosed reason for filing. The authors conclude that accelerating the timing of the disclosure window is an improvement that is in the best interest of the general investing public.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Originality/value</h3>\n<p>To the authors’ knowledge, this is the only academic study of Schedule 13D filings to include the postpandemic period. As such, the authors establish an updated “baseline projection” for expectations regarding how the Modernization final rule will impact activist investors and stock returns under a five-day reporting regime. In addition, the authors measure and test abnormal returns after considering differences between “triggering” events and filing dates of Schedule 13Ds in the sample rather than grouping all filings. This approach allows the authors to account for the time difference between the triggering event and the filing date.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->","PeriodicalId":44814,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Shrinking the 13D disclosure window will benefit non-activist investors\",\"authors\":\"Ryan Christopher Polk, Steve Buchheit, Mark E. Riley, Mary S. Stone\",\"doi\":\"10.1108/jfrc-01-2024-0016\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<h3>Purpose</h3>\\n<p>This study aims to examine the Securities and Exchange Commission’s final rule in Modernization of Beneficial Ownership Reporting, which reduced the time for significant public company shareholders to file Schedule 13D (effective February 5, 2024). The authors corroborate prior results under the historic 10-day maximum reporting regime and provide updated academic analysis regarding how the five-day deadline between the “triggering” event, accumulating 5% of the outstanding shares and public disclosure of that event will affect abnormal returns.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\\n<h3>Design/methodology/approach</h3>\\n<p>This empirical archival study uses publicly available data.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\\n<h3>Findings</h3>\\n<p>The analyses show that changing from a 10-day to a 5-day Schedule 13 disclosure window will reduce activist investors’ opportunity to profit by legally delaying the filing of Schedule 13D. These excess returns for delay exist regardless of the profitability or size of the target firm or the shareholder’s disclosed reason for filing. 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Shrinking the 13D disclosure window will benefit non-activist investors
Purpose
This study aims to examine the Securities and Exchange Commission’s final rule in Modernization of Beneficial Ownership Reporting, which reduced the time for significant public company shareholders to file Schedule 13D (effective February 5, 2024). The authors corroborate prior results under the historic 10-day maximum reporting regime and provide updated academic analysis regarding how the five-day deadline between the “triggering” event, accumulating 5% of the outstanding shares and public disclosure of that event will affect abnormal returns.
Design/methodology/approach
This empirical archival study uses publicly available data.
Findings
The analyses show that changing from a 10-day to a 5-day Schedule 13 disclosure window will reduce activist investors’ opportunity to profit by legally delaying the filing of Schedule 13D. These excess returns for delay exist regardless of the profitability or size of the target firm or the shareholder’s disclosed reason for filing. The authors conclude that accelerating the timing of the disclosure window is an improvement that is in the best interest of the general investing public.
Originality/value
To the authors’ knowledge, this is the only academic study of Schedule 13D filings to include the postpandemic period. As such, the authors establish an updated “baseline projection” for expectations regarding how the Modernization final rule will impact activist investors and stock returns under a five-day reporting regime. In addition, the authors measure and test abnormal returns after considering differences between “triggering” events and filing dates of Schedule 13Ds in the sample rather than grouping all filings. This approach allows the authors to account for the time difference between the triggering event and the filing date.
期刊介绍:
Since its inception in 1992, the Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance has provided an authoritative and scholarly platform for international research in financial regulation and compliance. The journal is at the intersection between academic research and the practice of financial regulation, with distinguished past authors including senior regulators, central bankers and even a Prime Minister. Financial crises, predatory practices, internationalization and integration, the increased use of technology and financial innovation are just some of the changes and issues that contemporary financial regulators are grappling with. These challenges and changes hold profound implications for regulation and compliance, ranging from macro-prudential to consumer protection policies. The journal seeks to illuminate these issues, is pluralistic in approach and invites scholarly papers using any appropriate methodology. Accordingly, the journal welcomes submissions from finance, law, economics and interdisciplinary perspectives. A broad spectrum of research styles, sources of information and topics (e.g. banking laws and regulations, stock market and cross border regulation, risk assessment and management, training and competence, competition law, case law, compliance and regulatory updates and guidelines) are appropriate. All submissions are double-blind refereed and judged on academic rigour, originality, quality of exposition and relevance to policy and practice. Once accepted, individual articles are typeset, proofed and published online as the Version of Record within an average of 32 days, so that articles can be downloaded and cited earlier.