Aijaz Ahmad Bhat, Javaid Iqbal Khan, Javed Ahmad Bhat, Sajad Ahmad Bhat
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It is to this end that the present study contributes.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Peer review</h3>\n<p>The peer review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/IJSE-02-2023-0098.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->","PeriodicalId":47714,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ECONOMICS","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Measuring central bank independence in India – a legal and behavioural case of Reserve Bank of India\",\"authors\":\"Aijaz Ahmad Bhat, Javaid Iqbal Khan, Javed Ahmad Bhat, Sajad Ahmad Bhat\",\"doi\":\"10.1108/ijse-02-2023-0098\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<h3>Purpose</h3>\\n<p>This study attempts to quantify the degree of independence of Central Bank of India from both legal and behavioural contexts over the period 1990–1991 to 2018–2019, a period encompassing major developments in the operation and regulation of Reserve Bank of India (RBI).</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\\n<h3>Design/methodology/approach</h3>\\n<p>We followed Jasmine <em>et al.</em> (2019) to calculate the magnitude of de jure independence of RBI and for de facto independence, “turnover rate (TOR) of CB governor” as proposed by Cukierman <em>et al.</em> (1992) is applied.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\\n<h3>Findings</h3>\\n<p>The results report that the legal autonomy of RBI increased specifically after the reforms and post formulation of Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). 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Measuring central bank independence in India – a legal and behavioural case of Reserve Bank of India
Purpose
This study attempts to quantify the degree of independence of Central Bank of India from both legal and behavioural contexts over the period 1990–1991 to 2018–2019, a period encompassing major developments in the operation and regulation of Reserve Bank of India (RBI).
Design/methodology/approach
We followed Jasmine et al. (2019) to calculate the magnitude of de jure independence of RBI and for de facto independence, “turnover rate (TOR) of CB governor” as proposed by Cukierman et al. (1992) is applied.
Findings
The results report that the legal autonomy of RBI increased specifically after the reforms and post formulation of Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). However, the actual independence of RBI remains more or less in line within the critical threshold limit of 0.2.
Practical implications
The study proposes effective implementation of laws and procedures designed to promote the independence of Central Bank of India imperative for an effective monetary operation along with a coordinated fiscal policy.
Originality/value
Targeted study of a particular central bank on its “independence” aspect in general and of the Reserve Bank of India in particular has not been attempted as on date. It is to this end that the present study contributes.
Peer review
The peer review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/IJSE-02-2023-0098.
期刊介绍：
The International Journal of Social Economics publishes original and peer-reviewed theoretical and empirical research in the field of social economics. Its focus is on the examination and analysis of the interaction between economic activity, individuals and communities. Social economics focuses on the relationship between social action and economies, and examines how social and ethical norms influence the behaviour of economic agents. It is inescapably normative and focuses on needs, rather than wants or preferences, and considers the wellbeing of individuals in communities: it accepts the possibility of a common good rather than conceiving of communities as merely aggregates of individual preferences and the problems of economics as coordinating those preferences. Therefore, contributions are invited which analyse and discuss well-being, welfare, the nature of the good society, governance and social policy, social and economic justice, social and individual economic motivation, and the associated normative and ethical implications of these as they express themselves in, for example, issues concerning the environment, labour and work, education, the role of families and women, inequality and poverty, health and human development.
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