Yuan Zhi, Caiju Li, Longyue Liang, Paul B. Hamilton, Yuanyuan Sun, Debin Xiong
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Government‐industrial‐research cooperation in virtual water strategy: A multi‐agent evolutionary game analysis
The virtual water strategy (VWS) is an effective tool to balance regional water resource endowments and guarantee water supply security. However, because of self‐interested games around VWS (human decision bias), there is a need for methods to maintain reliable cooperation between governments, virtual water (VW) enterprises and research institutions. This study builds a multi‐agent evolutionary game model to analyse the relationship of players and their impacts on VWS through changing decision mechanisms and the paths to enhance their confidence in cooperation. Considering differences in initial willingness to cooperate and changing factors affecting payoffs, an evolutionary game can produce changing stable equilibriums or stable cooperations, even if some players are reluctant to cooperate. Therefore, to promote the development of VWS, a multistep support mechanism can be built for the VW industry, which fosters model enterprises and optimizes the cooperation framework to stimulate research innovations at scientific institutions.
期刊介绍:
Accounts of Chemical Research presents short, concise and critical articles offering easy-to-read overviews of basic research and applications in all areas of chemistry and biochemistry. These short reviews focus on research from the author’s own laboratory and are designed to teach the reader about a research project. In addition, Accounts of Chemical Research publishes commentaries that give an informed opinion on a current research problem. Special Issues online are devoted to a single topic of unusual activity and significance.
Accounts of Chemical Research replaces the traditional article abstract with an article "Conspectus." These entries synopsize the research affording the reader a closer look at the content and significance of an article. Through this provision of a more detailed description of the article contents, the Conspectus enhances the article's discoverability by search engines and the exposure for the research.