基于位图的深度嵌入式系统安全监测

IF 6.6 2区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING
Anni Peng, Dongliang Fang, Le Guan, Erik van der Kouwe, Yin Li, Wenwen Wang, Limin Sun, Yuqing Zhang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

随着物联网(IoT)技术的出现,由微控制器驱动的深度嵌入式系统正变得越来越流行。然而,这些设备主要运行 C/C++ 代码,容易受到内存漏洞的影响,从而可能导致控制数据攻击和非控制数据攻击。现有的防御机制(如控制流完整性(CFI)、数据流完整性(DFI)和写完整性测试(WIT)等)需要消耗大量资源,在实际产品中实用性较差。为了实现轻量化,我们设计了一种基于位图的允许列表机制,统一存储运行时数据,以保护控制数据和非控制数据。无论部署了多少防御机制,内存需求都是恒定且较小的。我们将允许列表存储在信任区(TrustZone)中,以确保其完整性和保密性。同时,我们进行离线分析,检测潜在的碰撞,并在发生碰撞时做出相应调整。我们在基于 ARM Cortex-M 的开发板上实现了我们的想法。我们的评估结果表明,在不影响运行时性能的情况下,部署所提出的 CFI 和 DFI 机制可大幅减少内存消耗。具体来说,我们的原型执行 CFI 和 DFI 时,平均性能开销仅为 2.09%,内存开销为 32.56%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Bitmap-Based Security Monitoring for Deeply Embedded Systems

Deeply embedded systems powered by microcontrollers are becoming popular with the emergence of Internet of Things (IoT) technology. However, these devices primarily run C/C++ code and are susceptible to memory bugs, which can potentially lead to both control data attacks and non-control data attacks. Existing defense mechanisms (such as control flow integrity (CFI), data flow integrity (DFI) and write integrity testing (WIT), etc.) consume a massive amount of resources, making them less practical in real products. To make it lightweight, we design a bitmap-based allowlist mechanism to unify the storage of the runtime data for protecting both control data and non-control data. The memory requirements are constant and small, regardless of the number of deployed defense mechanisms. We store the allowlist in the TrustZone to ensure its integrity and confidentiality. Meanwhile, we perform an offline analysis to detect potential collisions and make corresponding adjustments when if happens. We have implemented our idea on an ARM Cortex-M based development board. Our evaluation results show a substantial reduction in memory consumption when deploying the proposed CFI and DFI mechanisms, without compromising runtime performance. Specifically, our prototype enforces CFI and DFI at a cost of just 2.09% performance overhead and 32.56% memory overhead on average.

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来源期刊
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology 工程技术-计算机:软件工程
CiteScore
6.30
自引率
4.50%
发文量
164
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: Designing and building a large, complex software system is a tremendous challenge. ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM) publishes papers on all aspects of that challenge: specification, design, development and maintenance. It covers tools and methodologies, languages, data structures, and algorithms. TOSEM also reports on successful efforts, noting practical lessons that can be scaled and transferred to other projects, and often looks at applications of innovative technologies. The tone is scholarly but readable; the content is worthy of study; the presentation is effective.
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