{"title":"无标度简约上内存一敲诈和慷慨的进化动力学","authors":"Lei Zhu, Yuying Zhu and Chengyi Xia","doi":"10.1209/0295-5075/ad49d3","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Both extortionate and generous strategies within the framework of zero-determinant (ZD) strategy can be linearly related to the opponent's payoffs. Here we explore their evolutionary performances for both iterated two-player and multi-player games. We mainly investigate two scenarios on simplicial complexes: one is the evolutionary scenario with cooperation (C), defection (D) and extortion (E), the other is the cooperation, defection and generosity (G). We find that both extortion and generosity can help cooperators resist the invasion of defectors. Intriguingly, the extortioner, who always enforces higher payoff than co-players, is more beneficial to promote cooperation than generosity. Compared with kindness and indulgence, being strict with the co-players can actually maintain cooperative behaviors in the long run. Simulations on the simplicial complexes revel that the catalytic effect of extortion on the evolution of cooperation even be more obvious in iterated multi-player social dilemmas than the two-player case, hence cooperation becomes more popular when the networks include more 2-simplex interactions. Our results can help to illustrate the role of higher-order interaction in the evolution of altruistic behaviors.","PeriodicalId":11738,"journal":{"name":"EPL","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Evolutionary dynamics of memory-one extortion and generosity on scale-free simplices\",\"authors\":\"Lei Zhu, Yuying Zhu and Chengyi Xia\",\"doi\":\"10.1209/0295-5075/ad49d3\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Both extortionate and generous strategies within the framework of zero-determinant (ZD) strategy can be linearly related to the opponent's payoffs. Here we explore their evolutionary performances for both iterated two-player and multi-player games. We mainly investigate two scenarios on simplicial complexes: one is the evolutionary scenario with cooperation (C), defection (D) and extortion (E), the other is the cooperation, defection and generosity (G). We find that both extortion and generosity can help cooperators resist the invasion of defectors. Intriguingly, the extortioner, who always enforces higher payoff than co-players, is more beneficial to promote cooperation than generosity. Compared with kindness and indulgence, being strict with the co-players can actually maintain cooperative behaviors in the long run. Simulations on the simplicial complexes revel that the catalytic effect of extortion on the evolution of cooperation even be more obvious in iterated multi-player social dilemmas than the two-player case, hence cooperation becomes more popular when the networks include more 2-simplex interactions. Our results can help to illustrate the role of higher-order interaction in the evolution of altruistic behaviors.\",\"PeriodicalId\":11738,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"EPL\",\"volume\":\"9 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-06-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"EPL\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"101\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/ad49d3\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"物理与天体物理\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"PHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"EPL","FirstCategoryId":"101","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/ad49d3","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"物理与天体物理","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"PHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Evolutionary dynamics of memory-one extortion and generosity on scale-free simplices
Both extortionate and generous strategies within the framework of zero-determinant (ZD) strategy can be linearly related to the opponent's payoffs. Here we explore their evolutionary performances for both iterated two-player and multi-player games. We mainly investigate two scenarios on simplicial complexes: one is the evolutionary scenario with cooperation (C), defection (D) and extortion (E), the other is the cooperation, defection and generosity (G). We find that both extortion and generosity can help cooperators resist the invasion of defectors. Intriguingly, the extortioner, who always enforces higher payoff than co-players, is more beneficial to promote cooperation than generosity. Compared with kindness and indulgence, being strict with the co-players can actually maintain cooperative behaviors in the long run. Simulations on the simplicial complexes revel that the catalytic effect of extortion on the evolution of cooperation even be more obvious in iterated multi-player social dilemmas than the two-player case, hence cooperation becomes more popular when the networks include more 2-simplex interactions. Our results can help to illustrate the role of higher-order interaction in the evolution of altruistic behaviors.
期刊介绍:
General physics – physics of elementary particles and fields – nuclear physics – atomic, molecular and optical physics – classical areas of phenomenology – physics of gases, plasmas and electrical discharges – condensed matter – cross-disciplinary physics and related areas of science and technology.
Letters submitted to EPL should contain new results, ideas, concepts, experimental methods, theoretical treatments, including those with application potential and be of broad interest and importance to one or several sections of the physics community. The presentation should satisfy the specialist, yet remain understandable to the researchers in other fields through a suitable, clearly written introduction and conclusion (if appropriate).
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