不对称核查:未来军备限制的一种选择

Q3 Social Sciences
Orbis Pub Date : 2024-01-01 DOI:10.1016/j.orbis.2024.05.004
John D. Maurer
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引用次数: 0

摘要

不断加剧的地缘政治竞争给未来的军控谈判带来了重大的政治挑战,同时也使现场视察变得不太可能,从而使国家军控核查工作变得更加复杂。在不进行现场视察的情况下核查未来军控协议的一种方法是依靠经国家技术情报部门核实的计数规则。美国决策者应考虑如何在未来的军控协议中将现场核查与计数规则结合起来。通过允许各方选择核查方式,未来的军控协议既能满足不同的安全偏好,又能保留美国的军事优势领域。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Asymmetric Verification: An Option for Future Arms Limitation

While rising geopolitical competition poses significant political challenges for future arms control negotiations, it also complicates national arms control verification by making on-site inspections unlikely. One way to verify future arms control agreements without on-site inspections would be to rely on counting rules verified by national technical intelligence. American policymakers should consider how they might combine on-site inspections and counting rules in future arms control agreements. By allowing each party to choose its verification modality, future arms control agreements could cater to different security preferences while also preserving areas of American military advantage.

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来源期刊
Orbis
Orbis SOCIAL SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY-
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
审稿时长
37 days
期刊介绍: Orbis, the Foreign Policy Research Institute quarterly journal of world affairs, was founded in 1957 as a forum for policymakers, scholars, and the informed public who sought an engaging, thought-provoking debate beyond the predictable, conventional journals of that time. Nearly half a century later, Orbis continues to offer informative, insightful, and lively discourse on the full range of topics relating to American foreign policy and national security, as well as in-depth analysis on important international developments. Orbis readers always know the stories behind the headlines.
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