{"title":"财务审计对治理实践的影响:来自非营利部门的证据","authors":"Raphael Duguay","doi":"10.2308/tar-2022-0525","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n I evaluate the effect of financial statement audits on the governance practices of nonprofit organizations. Using a regression discontinuity design that exploits revenue-based exemption thresholds, I find that financial audits cause organizations to implement governance mechanisms, such as conflict of interest policies, whistleblower policies, and formal approval of the CEO’s compensation by a committee. Consistent with these governance practices curtailing managers’ private benefits, I document reductions in nepotism and CEO-to-employee pay ratio. The results are more pronounced for organizations (1) whose audit is overseen by an audit committee, (2) that already have an independent board, and (3) that face high charity-level demand for oversight. Collectively, these findings shed light on how financial audits shape the governance practices of small, less sophisticated organizations like nonprofits in ways that go beyond financial statements’ direct use in decision-making and contracting.\n JEL Classifications: M42; G34; M48; L31.","PeriodicalId":503285,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Effect of Financial Audits on Governance Practices: Evidence from the Nonprofit Sector\",\"authors\":\"Raphael Duguay\",\"doi\":\"10.2308/tar-2022-0525\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n I evaluate the effect of financial statement audits on the governance practices of nonprofit organizations. Using a regression discontinuity design that exploits revenue-based exemption thresholds, I find that financial audits cause organizations to implement governance mechanisms, such as conflict of interest policies, whistleblower policies, and formal approval of the CEO’s compensation by a committee. Consistent with these governance practices curtailing managers’ private benefits, I document reductions in nepotism and CEO-to-employee pay ratio. The results are more pronounced for organizations (1) whose audit is overseen by an audit committee, (2) that already have an independent board, and (3) that face high charity-level demand for oversight. Collectively, these findings shed light on how financial audits shape the governance practices of small, less sophisticated organizations like nonprofits in ways that go beyond financial statements’ direct use in decision-making and contracting.\\n JEL Classifications: M42; G34; M48; L31.\",\"PeriodicalId\":503285,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Accounting Review\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Accounting Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2022-0525\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Accounting Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2022-0525","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Effect of Financial Audits on Governance Practices: Evidence from the Nonprofit Sector
I evaluate the effect of financial statement audits on the governance practices of nonprofit organizations. Using a regression discontinuity design that exploits revenue-based exemption thresholds, I find that financial audits cause organizations to implement governance mechanisms, such as conflict of interest policies, whistleblower policies, and formal approval of the CEO’s compensation by a committee. Consistent with these governance practices curtailing managers’ private benefits, I document reductions in nepotism and CEO-to-employee pay ratio. The results are more pronounced for organizations (1) whose audit is overseen by an audit committee, (2) that already have an independent board, and (3) that face high charity-level demand for oversight. Collectively, these findings shed light on how financial audits shape the governance practices of small, less sophisticated organizations like nonprofits in ways that go beyond financial statements’ direct use in decision-making and contracting.
JEL Classifications: M42; G34; M48; L31.