{"title":"无主体体验的不可能性","authors":"G. Strawson","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.5.026","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"All experience is experiencing, and therefore entails an experiencer — i.e.a subject of experience. This is an a priori truth. It does not entail that, in the case of any given episode of experience, the portion of reality that is correctly said to be the experiencer (the subject\n of the experience) is something ontically distinct from the portion of reality that is the episode of experience itself, and there is one metaphysically fundamental way of conceiving of the subject of experience — the thin conception — given which the subject of an experience is\n not ontically distinct from the experience.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Impossibility of Subjectless Experience\",\"authors\":\"G. Strawson\",\"doi\":\"10.53765/20512201.31.5.026\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"All experience is experiencing, and therefore entails an experiencer — i.e.a subject of experience. This is an a priori truth. It does not entail that, in the case of any given episode of experience, the portion of reality that is correctly said to be the experiencer (the subject\\n of the experience) is something ontically distinct from the portion of reality that is the episode of experience itself, and there is one metaphysically fundamental way of conceiving of the subject of experience — the thin conception — given which the subject of an experience is\\n not ontically distinct from the experience.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47796,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Consciousness Studies\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Consciousness Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"102\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.5.026\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"心理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.5.026","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
All experience is experiencing, and therefore entails an experiencer — i.e.a subject of experience. This is an a priori truth. It does not entail that, in the case of any given episode of experience, the portion of reality that is correctly said to be the experiencer (the subject
of the experience) is something ontically distinct from the portion of reality that is the episode of experience itself, and there is one metaphysically fundamental way of conceiving of the subject of experience — the thin conception — given which the subject of an experience is
not ontically distinct from the experience.