董事网络、会计保守主义和董事声誉:财务报告失败后的证据

IF 5.5 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了关联董事会是否会在财务错报后通过保守会计来恢复其声誉。利用 2004 年至 2020 年的重述公司样本,我们发现中心董事会与重述后时期的会计保守主义正相关。更重要的是,我们发现会计保守主义对中心董事会董事声誉的恢复有积极影响,从而在重述后获得更有声望的董事会席位、更多的外部董事职位和更高的报酬。在寻求外部融资的重述企业中,中心董事会董事的声誉恢复作用更为突出,因为在这些企业中,董事声誉的潜在收益更大。研究结果表明,中心董事会董事在重述后通过保守会计成功恢复了受损声誉,并最大限度地减少了董事市场的不利影响。我们的稳健性检验支持我们对证据的因果解释。总之,我们的研究为中央董事会董事在财务报告失败后通过保守会计恢复声誉所产生的监督激励提供了新的见解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Director networks, accounting conservatism and director reputation: Evidence after financial reporting failure
This study examines whether connected boards of directors restore their reputation via conservative accounting after financial misstatements. Using a sample of restating firms from 2004 to 2020, we find central boards of directors are positively related to accounting conservatism in the post-restatement period. More importantly, we find accounting conservatism has positive effects on the reputation restoration of directors in central boards, leading to more prestigious board seats, additional outside directorships, and higher compensation following restatements. The reputation recovery of directors in central boards is more prominent among restating firms that seek external financing where potential benefits of director reputation are greater. The findings suggest that directors in central boards successfully recover their damaged reputation via conservative accounting after restatements and minimize adverse consequences in the director market. Our robustness tests support the causal interpretation of our evidence. Collectively, our study offers novel insights into the monitoring incentives resulted from the reputation restoration of directors in central boards via conservative accounting after financial reporting failures.
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来源期刊
British Accounting Review
British Accounting Review BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
8.60
自引率
3.90%
发文量
39
审稿时长
76 days
期刊介绍: The British Accounting Review*is pleased to publish original scholarly papers across the whole spectrum of accounting and finance. The journal is eclectic and pluralistic and contributions are welcomed across a wide range of research methodologies (e.g. analytical, archival, experimental, survey and qualitative case methods) and topics (e.g. financial accounting, management accounting, finance and financial management, auditing, public sector accounting, social and environmental accounting; accounting education and accounting history), evidence from UK and non-UK sources are equally acceptable.
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