Simulating Civil Society in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA): Fog, Friction, and the Lebanese Port Explosion

Though the effects of fog and friction on decision-making are frequently simulated in military settings, they are less frequently extended to non-military and non-governmental MENA spaces. This article provides a description and evaluation of a disaster simulation rooted in the real-world event of the August 4, 2020 Lebanese port explosion. The aim of the simulation is to prompt student learning of the decision-making dynamics of CSOs amidst fog and friction in democratizing MENA spaces. A brief overview of the Lebanon-CSO landscape is provided. As part of their ruling strategy, sectarian elites engineer fog and friction to co-opt and fragment CSOs. This complex power sharing milieu creates dilemmas for CSOs. The simulation was designed for an entire classroom of students to experience the fog and friction in decision-making that CSOs encounter in MENA conditions of limited resources and urgent humanitarian need. Student learning, framed by Bloom’s taxonomy of levels of intellectual behavior, was assessed using qualitative entry and exit classroom surveys based on three iterations of the simulation. Qualitative interpretive content analysis was used to categorize survey responses. The sample is not statistically significant given the small class sizes at the College. The study serves as an initial exploration for assessing the promising pedagogical benefits of the Lebanon port explosion simulation. Before the simulation, students had knowledge and understanding of CSOs, democratization, and the Lebanese context. After the simulation, student surveys yielded results that evidenced higher- ordered learning. Students discovered the challenge of applying their knowledge of Lebanese CSOs amidst fog. Next, the panel stress- testing and critical reflection essay exercises prompted an analysis and evaluation of CSOs as weak or fraught vehicles for democratization in the region. In sum, fog and friction prompted students to experience and learn how CSOs may subvert democratization in the MENA despite intentions to “do good.” The Lebanon port explosion survey data indicate the value of simulations as “experience vehicles” that may push students to higher orders of abstracted thinking about CSOs in the MENA. Coupled with historical knowledge of co-optation and fragmentation strategies of elites vis-à-vis CSOs in Lebanon, the classroom simulation experience provided a low-cost and high-reward learning opportunity for students to grapple with the constraints and consequences of fog and friction on CSO decision-making.