{"title":"休谟与信仰的认知现象学","authors":"Kengo Miyazono","doi":"10.1017/can.2024.20","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article argues that Hume is committed to the cognitive phenomenology of believing. For Hume, beliefs have some distinctively cognitive phenomenology, which is different in kind from sensory phenomenology. I call this interpretation the “cognitive phenomenal interpretation” (“CPI”) of Hume. CPI is coherent with, and supported by, the textual evidence from <span>A Treatise of Human Nature</span> as well as <span>An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.</span> In both texts, Hume talks about the distinctive “manner” of believing, and CPI provides us with the best explanation of Hume’s remarks on this distinctive “manner.”</p>","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Hume and the Cognitive Phenomenology of Belief\",\"authors\":\"Kengo Miyazono\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/can.2024.20\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>This article argues that Hume is committed to the cognitive phenomenology of believing. For Hume, beliefs have some distinctively cognitive phenomenology, which is different in kind from sensory phenomenology. I call this interpretation the “cognitive phenomenal interpretation” (“CPI”) of Hume. CPI is coherent with, and supported by, the textual evidence from <span>A Treatise of Human Nature</span> as well as <span>An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.</span> In both texts, Hume talks about the distinctive “manner” of believing, and CPI provides us with the best explanation of Hume’s remarks on this distinctive “manner.”</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51573,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY\",\"volume\":\"37 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-06-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2024.20\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2024.20","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
This article argues that Hume is committed to the cognitive phenomenology of believing. For Hume, beliefs have some distinctively cognitive phenomenology, which is different in kind from sensory phenomenology. I call this interpretation the “cognitive phenomenal interpretation” (“CPI”) of Hume. CPI is coherent with, and supported by, the textual evidence from A Treatise of Human Nature as well as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In both texts, Hume talks about the distinctive “manner” of believing, and CPI provides us with the best explanation of Hume’s remarks on this distinctive “manner.”