休谟与信仰的认知现象学

IF 1.7 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Kengo Miyazono
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文认为,休谟致力于信仰的认知现象学。在休谟看来,信念具有某种独特的认知现象学,它在种类上不同于感官现象学。我把这种解释称为休谟的 "认知现象学解释"(CPI)。CPI 与《人性论》和《关于人类理解的探究》的文本证据相一致,并得到了它们的支持。在这两篇文章中,休谟都谈到了信仰的独特 "方式",而 CPI 为我们提供了对休谟关于这种独特 "方式 "的论述的最佳解释。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Hume and the Cognitive Phenomenology of Belief

This article argues that Hume is committed to the cognitive phenomenology of believing. For Hume, beliefs have some distinctively cognitive phenomenology, which is different in kind from sensory phenomenology. I call this interpretation the “cognitive phenomenal interpretation” (“CPI”) of Hume. CPI is coherent with, and supported by, the textual evidence from A Treatise of Human Nature as well as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In both texts, Hume talks about the distinctive “manner” of believing, and CPI provides us with the best explanation of Hume’s remarks on this distinctive “manner.”

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
11.10%
发文量
16
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