Janna van Grunsven, Lavinia Marin, Andrea Gammon, Trijsje Franssen
{"title":"4E 认知、道德想象力和工程伦理教育:为不同的具身视角塑造能力","authors":"Janna van Grunsven, Lavinia Marin, Andrea Gammon, Trijsje Franssen","doi":"10.1007/s11097-024-09987-6","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>While 4E approaches to cognition are increasingly introduced in educational contexts, little has been said about how 4E commitments can inform pedagogy aimed at fostering <i>ethical competencies</i>. Here, we evaluate a 4E-inspired ethics exercise that we developed at a technical university to enliven the <i>moral imagination</i> of engineering students. Our students participated in an interactive tinkering workshop, during which they materially redesigned a healthcare artifact. The aim of the workshop was twofold. Firstly, we wanted students to experience how material choices at the levels of design and functionality can enable morally significant reimaginings of the affordances commonly associated with existing artifacts. We term this type of reimagining <i>world-directed moral imagination</i>. Secondly, through the design process, we wanted students to robustly place themselves in the lived embodied perspectives of (potential) users of their selected artifacts. We term this <i>person-directed moral imagination</i>. While student testimonies about the exercise indicate that both their world-directed and person-directed moral imagination were enlivened, we note that the fostering of robust person-directed moral imagination proved challenging. Using 4E insights, we diagnose this challenge and ask how it might be overcome. To this end, we engage extensively with a recent 4E-informed critique of person-directed moral imagination, raised by Clavel Vázquez and Clavel-Vázquez (2023). They argue that person-directed moral imagination is profoundly limited, if not fundamentally misguided, particularly when exercised in contexts marked by emphatic embodied situated difference between the imaginer and the imagined. Building upon insights from both the 4E field and testimonies from critical disability studies, we argue that, while their critique is valuable, it ultimately goes too far. We conclude that a 4E approach can take on board recent 4E warnings regarding the limits of person-directed moral imagination while contributing positively to the development of moral imagination in engineering ethics education.</p>","PeriodicalId":51504,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"4E cognition, moral imagination, and engineering ethics education: shaping affordances for diverse embodied perspectives\",\"authors\":\"Janna van Grunsven, Lavinia Marin, Andrea Gammon, Trijsje Franssen\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s11097-024-09987-6\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>While 4E approaches to cognition are increasingly introduced in educational contexts, little has been said about how 4E commitments can inform pedagogy aimed at fostering <i>ethical competencies</i>. Here, we evaluate a 4E-inspired ethics exercise that we developed at a technical university to enliven the <i>moral imagination</i> of engineering students. Our students participated in an interactive tinkering workshop, during which they materially redesigned a healthcare artifact. The aim of the workshop was twofold. Firstly, we wanted students to experience how material choices at the levels of design and functionality can enable morally significant reimaginings of the affordances commonly associated with existing artifacts. We term this type of reimagining <i>world-directed moral imagination</i>. Secondly, through the design process, we wanted students to robustly place themselves in the lived embodied perspectives of (potential) users of their selected artifacts. We term this <i>person-directed moral imagination</i>. While student testimonies about the exercise indicate that both their world-directed and person-directed moral imagination were enlivened, we note that the fostering of robust person-directed moral imagination proved challenging. Using 4E insights, we diagnose this challenge and ask how it might be overcome. To this end, we engage extensively with a recent 4E-informed critique of person-directed moral imagination, raised by Clavel Vázquez and Clavel-Vázquez (2023). They argue that person-directed moral imagination is profoundly limited, if not fundamentally misguided, particularly when exercised in contexts marked by emphatic embodied situated difference between the imaginer and the imagined. Building upon insights from both the 4E field and testimonies from critical disability studies, we argue that, while their critique is valuable, it ultimately goes too far. We conclude that a 4E approach can take on board recent 4E warnings regarding the limits of person-directed moral imagination while contributing positively to the development of moral imagination in engineering ethics education.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51504,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences\",\"volume\":\"35 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-09987-6\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-09987-6","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
虽然 4E 认知方法越来越多地被引入教育环境中,但关于 4E 承诺如何为旨在培养道德能力的教学法提供信息,却鲜有人提及。在这里,我们评估了我们在一所技术大学开发的受 4E 启发的道德练习,以活跃工程专业学生的道德想象力。我们的学生参加了一个互动修补工作坊,在此期间,他们从物质上重新设计了一件医疗产品。工作坊的目的有两个。首先,我们想让学生们体验在设计和功能层面上的材料选择是如何实现对现有器物通常具有的承受能力进行具有道德意义的重新想象的。我们称这种重新想象为世界导向的道德想象。其次,在设计过程中,我们希望学生能够将自己置于所选人工制品(潜在)用户的生活体现视角中。我们称之为 "以人为本的道德想象力"。虽然学生对这项活动的评价表明,他们以世界为导向的道德想象力和以个人为导向的道德想象力都得到了活跃,但我们注意到,培养强有力的以个人为导向的道德想象力具有挑战性。利用 4E 的洞察力,我们对这一挑战进行了诊断,并提出了如何克服这一挑战的问题。为此,我们广泛地参与了克拉维尔-巴斯克斯和克拉克维尔-巴斯克斯(2023 年)最近对个人导向的道德想象力提出的以 4E 为基础的批评。他们认为,以人为本的道德想象力即使不是从根本上被误导,也是有很大局限性的,尤其是在想象者与被想象者之间存在明显的体现性情景差异的情况下。基于从 4E 领域和批判性残疾研究中获得的见解,我们认为,尽管他们的批评很有价值,但最终还是走得太远了。我们的结论是,4E 方法可以接受最近 4E 关于以人为本的道德想象力局限性的警告,同时为工程伦理教育中道德想象力的发展做出积极贡献。
4E cognition, moral imagination, and engineering ethics education: shaping affordances for diverse embodied perspectives
While 4E approaches to cognition are increasingly introduced in educational contexts, little has been said about how 4E commitments can inform pedagogy aimed at fostering ethical competencies. Here, we evaluate a 4E-inspired ethics exercise that we developed at a technical university to enliven the moral imagination of engineering students. Our students participated in an interactive tinkering workshop, during which they materially redesigned a healthcare artifact. The aim of the workshop was twofold. Firstly, we wanted students to experience how material choices at the levels of design and functionality can enable morally significant reimaginings of the affordances commonly associated with existing artifacts. We term this type of reimagining world-directed moral imagination. Secondly, through the design process, we wanted students to robustly place themselves in the lived embodied perspectives of (potential) users of their selected artifacts. We term this person-directed moral imagination. While student testimonies about the exercise indicate that both their world-directed and person-directed moral imagination were enlivened, we note that the fostering of robust person-directed moral imagination proved challenging. Using 4E insights, we diagnose this challenge and ask how it might be overcome. To this end, we engage extensively with a recent 4E-informed critique of person-directed moral imagination, raised by Clavel Vázquez and Clavel-Vázquez (2023). They argue that person-directed moral imagination is profoundly limited, if not fundamentally misguided, particularly when exercised in contexts marked by emphatic embodied situated difference between the imaginer and the imagined. Building upon insights from both the 4E field and testimonies from critical disability studies, we argue that, while their critique is valuable, it ultimately goes too far. We conclude that a 4E approach can take on board recent 4E warnings regarding the limits of person-directed moral imagination while contributing positively to the development of moral imagination in engineering ethics education.
期刊介绍:
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences is an interdisciplinary, international journal that serves as a forum to explore the intersections between phenomenology, empirical science, and analytic philosophy of mind. The journal represents an attempt to build bridges between continental phenomenological approaches (in the tradition following Husserl) and disciplines that have not always been open to or aware of phenomenological contributions to understanding cognition and related topics. The journal welcomes contributions by phenomenologists, scientists, and philosophers who study cognition, broadly defined to include issues that are open to both phenomenological and empirical investigation, including perception, emotion, language, and so forth. In addition the journal welcomes discussions of methodological issues that involve the variety of approaches appropriate for addressing these problems. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences also publishes critical review articles that address recent work in areas relevant to the connection between empirical results in experimental science and first-person perspective.Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.