{"title":"用于群体决策的自适应核心-纳什讨价还价博弈共识机制","authors":"Jie Tang, Fanyong Meng","doi":"10.1007/s10726-024-09888-8","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>As a process for ensuring the agreeable degree of individual opinions, consensus analysis is crucial for GDM. This paper focuses on the adaptive consensus mechanism. That's, different adjustment strategies are employed for various consensus levels. Unlike the feedback iteration method, this paper introduces an optimization model-based consensus-reaching procedure. To do this, optimal models are built to determine the minimum consensus adjustment at different levels. Then, the individual minimum consensus adjustment is analyzed, and the inconsistency between individual and group minimum consensus adjustments is concluded. After that, consensus adjustment cooperative games at three levels are proposed to allocate the total minimum consensus adjustment in view of the comprehensive evaluation. We can obtain the coalitional stability allocation scheme using the core of constructed cooperative games. Additionally, core-Nash bargaining games at three levels are proposed to ensure the fairness and coalitional stability of allocation results. Finally, a numerical example is offered to indicate the application of the new theoretical developments.</p>","PeriodicalId":47553,"journal":{"name":"Group Decision and Negotiation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"An Adaptive Core-Nash Bargaining Game Consensus Mechanism for Group Decision Making\",\"authors\":\"Jie Tang, Fanyong Meng\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10726-024-09888-8\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>As a process for ensuring the agreeable degree of individual opinions, consensus analysis is crucial for GDM. This paper focuses on the adaptive consensus mechanism. That's, different adjustment strategies are employed for various consensus levels. Unlike the feedback iteration method, this paper introduces an optimization model-based consensus-reaching procedure. To do this, optimal models are built to determine the minimum consensus adjustment at different levels. Then, the individual minimum consensus adjustment is analyzed, and the inconsistency between individual and group minimum consensus adjustments is concluded. After that, consensus adjustment cooperative games at three levels are proposed to allocate the total minimum consensus adjustment in view of the comprehensive evaluation. We can obtain the coalitional stability allocation scheme using the core of constructed cooperative games. Additionally, core-Nash bargaining games at three levels are proposed to ensure the fairness and coalitional stability of allocation results. Finally, a numerical example is offered to indicate the application of the new theoretical developments.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47553,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Group Decision and Negotiation\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-29\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Group Decision and Negotiation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-024-09888-8\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"MANAGEMENT\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Group Decision and Negotiation","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-024-09888-8","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"MANAGEMENT","Score":null,"Total":0}
An Adaptive Core-Nash Bargaining Game Consensus Mechanism for Group Decision Making
As a process for ensuring the agreeable degree of individual opinions, consensus analysis is crucial for GDM. This paper focuses on the adaptive consensus mechanism. That's, different adjustment strategies are employed for various consensus levels. Unlike the feedback iteration method, this paper introduces an optimization model-based consensus-reaching procedure. To do this, optimal models are built to determine the minimum consensus adjustment at different levels. Then, the individual minimum consensus adjustment is analyzed, and the inconsistency between individual and group minimum consensus adjustments is concluded. After that, consensus adjustment cooperative games at three levels are proposed to allocate the total minimum consensus adjustment in view of the comprehensive evaluation. We can obtain the coalitional stability allocation scheme using the core of constructed cooperative games. Additionally, core-Nash bargaining games at three levels are proposed to ensure the fairness and coalitional stability of allocation results. Finally, a numerical example is offered to indicate the application of the new theoretical developments.
期刊介绍:
The idea underlying the journal, Group Decision and Negotiation, emerges from evolving, unifying approaches to group decision and negotiation processes. These processes are complex and self-organizing involving multiplayer, multicriteria, ill-structured, evolving, dynamic problems. Approaches include (1) computer group decision and negotiation support systems (GDNSS), (2) artificial intelligence and management science, (3) applied game theory, experiment and social choice, and (4) cognitive/behavioral sciences in group decision and negotiation. A number of research studies combine two or more of these fields. The journal provides a publication vehicle for theoretical and empirical research, and real-world applications and case studies. In defining the domain of group decision and negotiation, the term `group'' is interpreted to comprise all multiplayer contexts. Thus, organizational decision support systems providing organization-wide support are included. Group decision and negotiation refers to the whole process or flow of activities relevant to group decision and negotiation, not only to the final choice itself, e.g. scanning, communication and information sharing, problem definition (representation) and evolution, alternative generation and social-emotional interaction. Descriptive, normative and design viewpoints are of interest. Thus, Group Decision and Negotiation deals broadly with relation and coordination in group processes. Areas of application include intraorganizational coordination (as in operations management and integrated design, production, finance, marketing and distribution, e.g. as in new products and global coordination), computer supported collaborative work, labor-management negotiations, interorganizational negotiations, (business, government and nonprofits -- e.g. joint ventures), international (intercultural) negotiations, environmental negotiations, etc. The journal also covers developments of software f or group decision and negotiation.