George Beknazar-Yuzbashev, Rafael J Jimenez Duran, M. Stalinski
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A Model of Harmful yet Engaging Content on Social Media
Why do social media users spend so much time consuming content that seemingly harms them? We build a simple model to argue that advertising-driven platforms can find it profitable to display content that harms users when it is complementary to their time spent on the platform. These incentives disappear, absent network effects, in the case of a subscription-based business model because harmful content reduces the willingness to pay for the platform. Our results warn against interpreting increases in engagement on social media as welfare increases.