通过直接购买进行危机救助：来自中国的证据

IF 3.6 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2024-05-22 DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107223

Lu Li , Chunbo Liu , Yongxin Xu , Xiaoyan Zhang , Gaoping Zheng

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引用次数: 0

摘要

2015 年股市危机期间，中国政府动用了数千亿美元直接在二级市场购买股票。我们发现，与未获救企业相比，获救企业在获救后的流动性显著降低。与流动性枯竭假说和坏公司信号假说相比，后续干预的政策不确定性能更好地解释流动性的减少。与政府救助可能带来的道德风险不符的是，获救企业的投资政策在获救后变得更加保守。我们的证据警示了直接购买救助计划的意外后果。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Crisis rescue via direct purchase: Evidence from China

During the 2015 stock market crisis, the Chinese government used hundreds of billions of dollars to purchase shares directly in the secondary market. We find that compared with non-rescued firms, rescued firms have significantly lower liquidity after being rescued. Policy uncertainty regarding subsequent interventions better explains the reduction in liquidity than the liquidity dry-up and bad firm signaling hypotheses. Inconsistent with the potential moral hazards associated with government bailouts, the investment policies of rescued firms become more conservative after being rescued. Our evidence warns of the unintended consequences of direct purchase rescue programs.

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来源期刊

Journal of Banking & Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

6.40

自引率

5.40%

发文量

262

期刊介绍： The Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF) publishes theoretical and empirical research papers spanning all the major research fields in finance and banking. The aim of the Journal of Banking and Finance is to provide an outlet for the increasing flow of scholarly research concerning financial institutions and the money and capital markets within which they function. The Journal''s emphasis is on theoretical developments and their implementation, empirical, applied, and policy-oriented research in banking and other domestic and international financial institutions and markets. The Journal''s purpose is to improve communications between, and within, the academic and other research communities and policymakers and operational decision makers at financial institutions - private and public, national and international, and their regulators. The Journal is one of the largest Finance journals, with approximately 1500 new submissions per year, mainly in the following areas: Asset Management; Asset Pricing; Banking (Efficiency, Regulation, Risk Management, Solvency); Behavioural Finance; Capital Structure; Corporate Finance; Corporate Governance; Derivative Pricing and Hedging; Distribution Forecasting with Financial Applications; Entrepreneurial Finance; Empirical Finance; Financial Economics; Financial Markets (Alternative, Bonds, Currency, Commodity, Derivatives, Equity, Energy, Real Estate); FinTech; Fund Management; General Equilibrium Models; High-Frequency Trading; Intermediation; International Finance; Hedge Funds; Investments; Liquidity; Market Efficiency; Market Microstructure; Mergers and Acquisitions; Networks; Performance Analysis; Political Risk; Portfolio Optimization; Regulation of Financial Markets and Institutions; Risk Management and Analysis; Systemic Risk; Term Structure Models; Venture Capital.